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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
JUSTICE KAVANAUGH, LORENZO V SEC,
AND THE POST-KENNEDY SUPREME
COURT
MATTHEW C. TURK & KAREN E. WOODY*
This Article analyzes a recent Supreme Court case, Lorenzo v. Securities and
Exchange Commission, and explains why it provides a valuable window into the
Court's future now that Justice Kennedy has retired and his seat filled by Justice Brett
Kavanaugh. Lorenzo is an important case that raises fundamental interpretative ques-
tions about the reach of ederal securities tatutes. But most significant is its unique pro-
cedural posture: when the Supreme Court issues its decision on Lorenzo in 2019, Jus-
tice Kavanaugh will be recused while the other eight Justices rule on a lower court opinion
from the D. C. Circuit in which he wrote separately in an extensive dissent.
That dissent is quite remarkable. It contains a scathing assessment of securities fraud
enforcement and adjudication at the SEC, the majority opinion's interpretation of deceptive
financial conduct under Rule 1 Ob-5, and the SEC's overall role in the development of ed-
eral securities law doctrine. Judge Kavanaugh's dissent also goes on to identify how the
legal deficiencies pecific to Lorenzo motivate his broader skepticism towards the consti-
tutional legitimacy of the administrative and regulatoy state as a whole; a view that rep-
resents his signature contribution as a federal judge. Thus, in Lorenzo, the definingju-
dicial philosophy of the newest Supreme Court Justice is on full display.
More broadly, this Article demonstrates that the deeper import ofLorenzo is not what
it reveals about the views ofJustice Kavanaugh. Rather, it is in the reception those views
will meet from the other eight Justices on the Court. In addressing the argument set forth
in the Lorenzo dissent, the current members of the Court will be confronting the positions
of their newest peer and colleague. By necessity, they will also signal their openness to be-
* Matthew C. Turk and Karen E. Woody are both Assistant Professors of Business Law at
Indiana University's Kelley School of Business. We would like to thank Andy Vollmer for
his thoughtful comments on early drafts.
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ing persuaded by Justice Kavanaugh on the issues where he speaks with greatest authority
and can be expected to act as forceful advocate for his vision of the law at the Court. Lo-
renzo can therefore be seen as a bellwether forJustice Kavanaugh's influence as judicial
entrepreneur on behalf of his trademark theory of the Constitutional separation of powers
in administrative law. Most importantly, the case bears directly on the area of adminis-
trative law where the stakes are highest of all-the role that Justice Kavanaugh may play
in the demise of the Chevron doctrine and the collapse ofjudicial deference toward the
administrative state.
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I. INTRODUCTION
When Justice Anthony Kennedy announced his retirement on June 27,
2018, after thirty years on the U.S. Supreme Court, the inevitable guessing
game began as to who his replacement might be.1 After President Trump
nominated D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals Judge Brett Kavanaugh on July
9, 2018,2 speculation quickly turned to how the future decisionmaking of
the Court will be impacted once Judge Kavanaugh arrived, given his likeli-
hood of being confirmed by the Senate.3 Early commentary on the legal
direction that a post-Kennedy Supreme Court featuring Judge Kavanaugh
would take did not get very far, however. Most discussion of Brett Ka-
vanaugh's record as a federal judge was set aside after the explosive revela-
tion of several sexual assault allegations, which, understandably, turned the
confirmation process into a referendum on his personal history and charac-
ter.
4
The nomination hearing held by the Senate Judiciary Committee prior
to the allegations against Judge Kavanaugh was not particularly enlighten-
ing either.5 In addition to the standard political grandstanding, the ques-
1. See Robert Barnes, Justice Kennedy, the Pivotal Swing Vote on the Supreme Court, Announces
His Retirement, WASH. POST (June 27, 2018), https://ww.washingtonpost.com/politics/
courts-law/justice-kennedy-the-pivotal-swing-vote-on-the-supreme-court-announces-retire
ment/2018/06/27/a40a8c64-5932-11 e7-a204-ad706461 fa4fstory.html?utmterm =.8959c
419812a.
2. See Trump Announces Brett Kavanaugh as Supreme Court Nominee: Full Video and Transcript,
N.Y. TIMES (July 9, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/09/us/politics/trump-
supreme-court-announcement-transcript.html.
3. See Sheryl Gay Stolberg et al., Senate Democrats Come Out Swinging in Long-Shot Fight to
Block Kavanaugh, N.Y. TiMES (July 10, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/10/
us/politics/democrats-brett-kavanaugh-supreme-court.html.
4. See Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Kavanagh Is Sworn In After Close Confirmation Vote in Senate, N.Y.
TIMES (Oct. 6, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10 / 6/us/politics/brett-kavanaugh
-supreme-court.html.
5. Judge Kavanaugh's nomination hearings began on September 4, 2018. See Confirma-
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tioning itself revolved exclusively around Supreme Court precedents con-
cerning hot-button social issues, such as affirmative action, abortion, LGBT
rights, and the Second Amendment's protection of gun ownership. And
while the interests those cases affect are no doubt important, anticipating
Justice Kavanaugh's position in controversial culture-war decisions pro-
vides a limited perspective on the influence he will have on the Court.
That is because, by most accounts, his views on those issues do not stand
out relative to the other two-dozen individuals that were on President
Trump's shortlist of potential nominees.6 Along with the other members of
that group, Justice Kavanaugh was an utterly conventional GOP nominee
with respect to the usual ideological litmus tests.
Yet, as this Article will explain, Justice Kavanaugh does have a distin-
guishing brand of jurisprudence that separates him from the other rising
legal stars who were considered for the nomination.7 When it comes to
cases on regulatory policymaking-and the relationship between the federal
courts and administrative agencies more generally-Justice Kavanaugh has
developed an elaborate, sophisticated critique of the current state of the law
6. See, Carole Joffe, With the Appointment of Brett Kavanaugh, Roe v. Wade Is Likely Dead,
WASH. POST (July 10, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/made-by-history/
wp/2018/07/1 0/with-the-appointment-of-brett-kavanaugh-roe-v-wade-is-likely-dead/?utm
term=.2ee47f92e106 (recognizing that President Trump "promise[d] to only nominate
'pro-life' judges to the court" and asserting that "[m]uch of the debate over the nomination
of Brett Kavanaugh to succeed Anthony M. Kennedy on the Supreme Court will center on
the fate of Roe v. Wade and the future of abortion rights in America"); Mark Joseph Stem,
Anthony Kennedy JFust Destroyed His Legacy as a Gay Rights Hero, SLATE (June 27, 2018),
https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2018/06/anthony-kennedy-destroyed-his-gay-rights-
legacy-by-retiring-under-trump.html ("Trump is all but assured to replace Kennedy with a
judge who shares the conservatives' opposition to gay rights.... Brett Kavanaugh of the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit is a top contender."); Eric Lesh,
Judge Kavanaugh Will Take a Sledgehammer to Justice Kennedy's LGBTQ Rights Legacy,
REWIRE.NEwS (July 12, 2018), https://rewire.news/article/2018/07/12/judge-kavanaugh-
will-take-sledgehammer-justice-kennedys-lgbtq-rights-legacy/.
7. For a selection of Justice Kavanaugh's published speeches and other writings, see
generally Brett M. Kavanaugh, Kgynote Address: Two Challenges for the Judge as Umpire: Statutory
Ambiguiy and Constitutional Exceptions, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1907 (2017) [hereinafter Ka-
vanaugh, Kgynote Address]; Brett M. Kavanaugh, Fixing Statutory Interpretation: Book Review of
Robert A. Katzmann: Judging Statutes, 129 HARv. L. REv. 2118 (2016) [hereinafter Kavanaugh,
Fixing Statutory Interpretation]; Brett M. Kavanaugh, Separation of Powers During the Forty-Fourth
Presidency and Bgyond, 93 MINN. L. REv. 1454 (2009) [hereinafter Kavanaugh, Separation of
Powers]; Brett M. Kavanaugh, The President and the Independent Counsel, 86 GEO. LJ. 2133
(1997) [hereinafter Kavanaugh, The President and the Independent Counsel]; Brett M. Kavanaugh,
Note, Defense Presence and Participation: A Procedural Minimum for Batson v. Kentucky Hearings, 99
YALE LJ. 187 (1989) (justice Kavanaugh's student note) [hereinafter Kavanaugh, Note];
Brett M. Kavanaugh, The Role of the Judiciary in Maintaining the Separation of Powers, HERITAGE
FOUND. LECTURE (Oct. 25, 2017), https://www.heritage.org/sites/default/files/2018-
02/HL1284.pdf [hereinafter Kavanaugh, Maintaining the Separation of Powers].
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that is all his own.8 If he has a signature impact on the Court, it will be in
that area.9 As this Article further argues, one of the best ways to under-
stand what that impact may be is by taking a closer look at a case that Jus-
tice Kavanaugh heard last year as a judge on the D.C. Circuit: Lorenzo v.
Securities & Exchange Commission.'0
Lorenzo is an important case in its own right, and it raises fundamental in-
terpretative questions about the reach of federal securities statutes dealing
with financial fraud."I In his dissenting opinion, then-Judge Kavanaugh
lays out his view on those questions as well as their place within the broader
landscape of securities law doctrine.12 The dissent in Lorenzo goes far be-
yond technical questions of securities regulation, though. In discussing the
Securities and Exchange Commission's (SEC's) enforcement and adjudica-
tive record in Lorenzo, Judge Kavanaugh also presents a comprehensive
statement of his philosophy on the federal administrative-and-regulatory
structure-the same philosophy that is likely to be his defining contribution
as a Supreme Court Justice.13 A careful reading of Lorenzo therefore turns
up invaluable insights into the judicial perspective that Justice Kavanaugh
will bring to the post-Kennedy Supreme Court.
Even more significant than the particular legal questions presented in Lo-
renzo is its unique procedural posture. On June 18, 2018, the Supreme
Court granted Lorenzo's petition for certiorari (cert) and placed the case on
the docket for its October 2018 Term.14 When the Court's current eight
Justices issue an opinion on the case,15 they will be responding to Justice
Kavanaugh as a peer, who they will be persuaded by and seek to persuade
for the remainder of his presumably multi-decade tenure at One First
Street.16 As a consequence, Lorenzo will reveal much more than howJustice
8. See generally Kavanaugh, Keynote Address, supra note 7; Kavanaugh, Fixing Statutory Inter-
pretation, supra note 7; Kavanaugh, Separation of Powers, supra note 7; Kavanaugh, The President
and the Independent Counsel, supra note 7; Kavanaugh, Note, supra note 7; Kavanaugh, Maintain-
ing the Separation of Powers, supra note 7.
9. Cf Jonathan H. Adler, Will Kavanaugh Curb Sloppy White House Deregulation?, N.Y.
TIMEs (July 16, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/16/opinion/brett-kavanaugh-
supreme-court-administrative-state.html (noting Kavanaugh's extensive collection of opin-
ions on administrative law principles); Jonathan H. Adler, Judge Kavanaugh and the Administra-
tive State, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY July 16, 2018), https://reason.com/volokh/2018/07/16/
judge-kavanaugh-and-the-administrative-s.
10. 872 F.3d 578 (D.C. Cir. 2017).
11. See id. at 580; see infra Section I (providing an overview of the case).
12. Lorenzo, 872 F.3d at 597-602 (Kavanaugh,J., dissenting).
13. Id. at 602.
14. Order Granting Certiorari, Lorenzo v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2650 (June 18, 2018)
(granting Lorenzo's petition for certiorari).
15. October 2018 Term Calendar, U.S. SUP. CT., https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral-
arguments/2018TermCourtCalendar.pdf (last visited Oct. 12, 2018) (providing the Court's
schedule for this coming term, which is set to conclude onJune 20, 2019).
16. In the empirical literature on judicial decisionmaking, there is a well-established set
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Kavanaugh tends to vote, or the fact that his opinions on the D.C. Circuit
often receive weighty consideration when reaching the Court. For the oth-
er four conservative Justices especially, Lorenzo presents an occasion to
gauge the Court's receptiveness to Judge Kavanaugh's judicial philosophy
on administrative law, the area where he speaks with greatest authority and
can be expected to function as a "judicial entrepreneur" who will actively
advocate for his preferred vision of the law over the coming years. 
17
Accordingly, the broader goal of this Article's analysis is to demonstrate
how Lorenzo functions as a predictive device that reflects the future course of
the Court now that Justice Kennedy has been replaced by Justice Ka-
vanaugh. Specifically, it identifies two areas where Lorenzo may come to
mark a turning point. The first is securities law proper. With respect to the
merits of the case itself, Lorenzo could force the Court's hand in articulating
concrete answers to some foundational yet murky open questions in securi-
ties fraud doctrine.18
Lorenzo also may operate as a barometer for the future course of the Su-
preme Court's securities law jurisprudence as a whole. In concluding his
dissent, then-Judge Kavanaugh extends his critique of the SEC's specific
enforcement practices at issue in Lorenzo to make a compelling call for an
end to the judicial complacency which has characterized the Court's in-
cremental decisionmaking in securities cases since the appointment ofJohn
Roberts as ChiefJustice in 2005.19 If the other Justices prove receptive to
of findings on "panel effects" at circuit courts-a phenomenon where one judge's vote is in-
fluenced by the composition of his or her colleagues on the same judicial panel or court.
Reframed in the jargon of this literature, the question is what panel effect Justice Ka-
vanaugh's will have on the Court now that he has been confirmed. See generally Joshua B.
Fischman, Interpreting Circuit Court Voting Patterns: A Social Interactions Framework, 31 J.L. ECON.
& ORG. 808 (2013) (surveying the various theoretical explanations for panel effects); Pauline
T. Kim, Deliberation and Strategy on the United States Court of Appeals: An Empirical Exploration of
Panel Effects, 157 U. PA. L. REv. 1319 (2009) (documenting the extent to which panel effects
appear when judges sit on the same court but not on the same case).
17. Cf A.C. Pritchard, Justice Lewis F Powell, Jr., and the Counterrevolution in the Federal Secu-
rities Laws, 52 DUKE LJ. 841 (2003) (detailing how Justice Powell exemplified the role ofju-
dicial entrepreneur by leveraging his expertise on securities law during his tenure on the
Court in the 1970s and 1980s); see also Frank B. Cross & Stefanie Lindquist, Juging the Judges,
58 DUKE LJ. 1383, 1419-22 (2009) (citing Stephen Choi & Mitu Gulati, A Tournament of
Judges, 92 CAL. L. REv. 299 (2004)) (discussing two particular judicial styles: the entrepreneur
and minimalist).
18. These include the forms of deceptive conduct that can give rise to a claim for secu-
rities fraud, as well as the relationship between primary and secondary (aiding-and-abetting)
liability that determines the availability of those claims in SEC enforcement actions and for
private investor securities plaintiffs. See infra Section I (analyzing the future of securities
fraud doctrine and enforcement after Lorenzo).
19. Lorenzo v. SEC, 872 F.3d 578, 601 (D.C. Cir. 2017). See generally Matthew C. Turk
& Karen E. Woody, Leidos and the Roberts Court's Improvident Securities Law Docket, 70 STAN. L.
REV. ONLIE 89 (2017) (analyzing the Roberts Court's decisionmaking in securities law cas-
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that call, Lorenzo would lead a return to the more activist mode of judging
that defined the "counter-revolution" in Supreme Court securities decisions
during the tenure of Justice Powell in the Burger and Rehnquist Court
eras.2
0
The second area where Lorenzo may be a leading indicator relates to the
dissent's exposition of Judge Kavanaugh's trademark separation-of-powers
critique of administrative law. In his opinion, Judge Kavanaugh is openly
skeptical of the "agency-centric process"21 that has become the focal point
of the modern regulatory state and suggests that it "is in some tension"22
with the judicial prerogatives established under Article III of the U.S. Con-
stitution.23 Once Judge Kavanaugh's critique of agency decisionmaking in
those passages is fully unpacked, it becomes clear that the Lorenzo dissent
has wide-ranging implications which touch on nearly every area of existing
administrative law doctrine.
The biggest target in Justice Kavanaugh's crosshairs on administrative
law matters is hard to miss. By announcing that the SEC's legal positions
in Lorenzo "deserve[] judicial repudiation, not judicial deference or re-
spect,"24 the dissent questions the underlying function of judicial review in
the modern administrative state, including its embodiment in the Chevron
doctrine.25 Thus, the ultimate legacy of Lorenzo as bellwether for the post-
Kennedy Supreme Court may be to ring the death knell for the standard
theories ofjudicial deference in administrative law.
The discussion below proceeds as follows: Section II provides case back-
ground on Lorenzo. Section III analyzes the import of Lorenzo for securities-
fraud doctrine and discusses the possible ways in which the Court may re-
solve those issues with its decision in the case next summer. Section IV ex-
plores Lorenzo as a possible reorientation of the Court's securities law juris-
prudence as a whole. Section V addresses Justice Kavanaugh's Lorenzo
dissent in relation to his overall theory of administrative law, and its impli-
cation for the future of Chevron deference. A final section briefly concludes.
II. LORENZO CASE BACKGROUND
A. Facts
Lorenzo turns on a relatively colorful set of facts, at least as far as securities
litigations go. The case centers around two financial professionals, Francis
es).
20. See infra Section IV.B. 1.
21. Lorenzo, 872 F.3d at 602.
22. Id
23. Id. (referencing the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause and the Seventh
Amendment right to a civil trial).
24. Id. at 600.
25. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
2019]
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V. Lorenzo (Lorenzo) and Gregg Lorenzo, who happen to share the same
last name but are unrelated.2 6 Both Lorenzos worked at Charles Vista,
LLC, a registered broker-dealer that Gregg Lorenzo owned and operated
after opening the firm in February of 2009.27 Lorenzo worked under Gregg
Lorenzo since joining Charles Vista in the summer of 2009, where his for-
mal job title was Director of Investment Banking.
28
As Director of Investment Banking, Lorenzo was responsible for manag-
ing the account of the Charles Vista's largest client, a renewable energy
start-up called Waste2Energy Holdings, Inc. (Waste2Energy).
29
Waste2Energy had an interesting business model. The value of the com-
pany turned almost entirely on a single piece of intellectual property, which
was a technology that it believed could transform "solid waste" (i.e. gar-
bage) into electricity.3 0 This attempt at modern day alchemy turned out to
be about as hard as it sounds. Eventually, Waste2Energy recognized it
would never be able to successfully develop the technology, and publicly
wrote down the value of its intellectual property (previously estimated to be
worth $10 million) to essentially zero on October 1, 2009.
3 1
Due to its worsening financial condition, Waste2Energy was in need of
additional funding and turned to Charles Vista in order to escape financial
ruin.3 2 The plan was for Charles Vista to act as the placement agent for an
upcoming debt offering by Waste2Energy, which sought to issue $15 mil-
lion worth of convertible debentures (a kind of corporate bond).
33 In ex-
change, Charles Vista would receive twenty percent of the proceeds.
34
Lorenzo worked at the direction of his boss Gregg Lorenzo as the point
person for Waste2Energy's debt offering. On October 14, 2009, Gregg Lo-
renzo drafted an email regarding the Waste2Energy bonds and asked Lo-
renzo to send it to a pair of Charles Vista clients, William Rothe and Vishal
Goolcharan.35 Both emails contained the same language concerning finan-
26. Gregg C. Lorenzo, Francis V. Lorenzo, and Charles Vista LLC, Exchange Act Re-
lease No. 544, 2013 WL 6858820, at *2 (ALJ Dec. 31, 2013) (initial decision) [hereinafter
ALJ Decision].
27. Gregg C. Lorenzo, Exchange Act Release No. 9480, 2013 WL 6087352, at *2
(Nov. 20, 2013) [hereinafter Charles Vista & Gregg Lorenzo SEC Settlement Order].
28. ALJ Decision, 2013 WL 6858820, at *2.
29. See id. at *1-2; Charles Vista & Gregg Lorenzo SEC Settlement Order, 2013 WL
6087352, at *2.
30. ALJ Decision, 2013 WL 6858820, at *3.
31. Waste2Energy announced the write-down in a Form 8-K, released on October 1,
2009. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. at *3 ("In September 2009, W2E was preparing to offer up to $15 million in
12% convertible debentures, and Charles Vista was the placement agent for this offering.").
34. Francis V. Lorenzo, Exchange Release No. 9762, 2015 WL 1927763, at *3 (Apr.
29, 2015) [hereinafter SEC Commission Decision].
35. Id. at *4.
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cial details of the Waste2Energy debt offering, which we have consolidated
here for comparison:
Dear Sir: At the request of... Gregg Lorenzo, the Investment Banking division
of Charles Vista has summarized several key points of the Waste2Engergy Holdings,
Inc. Debenture Offering....
There are 3 levels of protection: T The Company has over $10 mm in
confirmed assets; (H1) The Company has purchase orders and LOI's [Letters of
Intent] for over $43 mm in orders; (I) Charles Vista has agreed to raise additional
monies to repay these Debenture holders (if necessary).36
The two emails also included text indicating that the recipients should
contact Lorenzo with any questions and signed off with a footer that listed
Lorenzo's name and title as Vice President of Investment Banking at
Charles Vista.37 Lorenzo sent the emails to Rothe and Goolcharan on the
same day that Gregg Lorenzo instructed him to do so.38
Rothe decided not to invest and may have never opened the email.39
Goolcharan took the Lorenzos up on their offer and purchased $15,000
worth of Waste2Energy debentures through Charles Vista's brokerage de-
partment.40 The fee earned by Lorenzo from the entire affair, which was
based on his standard one-percent commission, came to $150.41
B. Lorenzo Before the SEC
On February 15, 2013, the SEC's enforcement division commenced an
action against Gregg Lorenzo, Francis Lorenzo, and Charles Vista based
on their involvement with the Waste2Energy debt offering. All three were
charged with civil securities fraud in violation of Section 17(a) of the 1933
Securities Act,42 Section 10(b) of the 1934 Exchange Act,43 and Rule lOb-
36. ALJ Decision, 2013 WL 6858820, at *4 (emphases added).
37. Id at *4.
38. Id.
39. Id
40. SEC Commission Decision, 2015 WL 1927763, at *5.
41. Id. Lorenzo's total take-home pay while working for Charles Vista was not much
better. He earned $120,000 in salary during his tenure, but may have netted closer to
$40,000, because Charles Vista never made good on its promise to reimburse the roughly
$80,000 in business expenses that Lorenzo allegedly accrued during that time. Id. at *2.
42. 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (2012). Section 17 states in relevant part:
It shall be unlawful for any person in the offer or sale of any securities or any security-
based swap agreement by the use of any means or instruments of transportation or
communication in interstate commerce or by use of the mails, directly or indirectly-
(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, or
(2) to obtain money or property by means of any untrue statement of a material fact
or any omission to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements
made, in light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading; or
(3) to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser.
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5.44 Gregg Lorenzo and Charles Vista entered into a settlement with SEC,
which was finalized on November 20, 2013.45 Lorenzo did not settle. The
SEC's charges against him were therefore adjudicated within the SEC's
administrative courts, first before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), and
then on appeal to the SEC Board of Commissioners (the SEC Commis-
sion).
46
1. The ALJ Decision
The ALJ issued an order on December 31, 2013, holding Lorenzo liable
on all the SEC's charges.47 In the decision, the ALJ described the falsity of
Lorenzo's emails to Rothe and Goolcharan "staggering,"
48 and found that
he had knowingly sent the statements they contained with "at least a reck-
less degree of scienter."1
49
The most notable feature of the ALJ decision, particularly for purposes
of the D.C. Circuit's subsequent ruling, was the evidentiary basis for its fact
conclusion on the issue of scienter. In considering Lorenzo's charges, the
ALJ primarily relied upon testimony that Lorenzo provided during a two-
day hearing that was held at the SEC in September of 2013.50 After quot-
ing a number of excerpts from the hearing, the ALJ decision sums up Lo-
renzo's testimony as suggesting that "Frank Lorenzo sent the emails with-
out even thinking about the contents."
51 For the ALJ, such neglect was
Id.
43. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b). Section 10(b) states in relevant part:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any na-
tional securities exchange-
[...I
(b) [t]o use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security regis-
tered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, or any secu-
rities-based swap agreement any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in
contravention of such rules and regulations as the [SEC] may prescribe as necessary
or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.
Id.
44. 17 C.F.R. § 240.1Ob-5 (2018). Rule lOb-5 was promulgated pursuant to Section
10(b) by the SEC in 1942.
45. Charles Vista & Gregg Lorenzo SEC Settlement Order, Exchange Act Release No.
9480, 2013 WL 6087352, at *1 (Nov. 20, 2013).
46. See generally SEC Commission Decision, 2015 WL 1927763, at *1; ALJ Decision,
Exchange Act Release No. 544, 2013 WL 6858820, at *1 (ALJ Dec. 31, 2013).
47. AL Decision, 2013 WL 6858820, at *5.
48. Id. at *7.
49. Id. at *8.
50. Id at*l.
51. Id. at *5 (Lorenzo testified as follows: "I just didn't give it much thought at the time.
My boss asked me to send these e-mails out and I sent them out.... The guy owns the firm.
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sufficiently unjustifiable that it amounted to willful violation of the securities
laws: "Had [Lorenzo] taken a minute to read the text, he would have real-
ized that it was false and misleading and that [Waste2Energy] was not
worth anything near what was being represented to potential investors."52
Lorenzo's attempts to emphasize his subordinate position within Charles
Vista was also to little avail. As the ALJ concluded: "[Lorenzo] cannot es-
cape liability by claiming that Gregg Lorenzo ordered him to send the
emails. The fact that Gregg Lorenzo contributed to the misrepresentation
does not relieve Frank Lorenzo from responsibility."53
In light of what the ALJ characterized as Lorenzo's "egregious and re-
peated"54 conduct-which was further "aggravat[ed]" by his "attempt to
displace blame onto both Gregg Lorenzo and [Waste2Energy]"55-the ALJ
imposed a three-part sanction. Specifically, the decision ordered that Lo-
renzo: (a) cease-and-desist from committing future violations of the securi-
ties laws at issue; (b) pay a $15,000 civil money penalty; and (c) be subject to
a lifetime bar against future participation in the securities industry.56
2. The SEC Commission Decision
Lorenzo's appeal to the SEC Commission was also to no avail. On April
29, 2015, the Commission issued a decision which upheld the prior ALJ
order in full. 57 The Commission substantially developed both the factual
and legal bases for Lorenzo's liability.
On the question of scienter, the SEC Commission treads through addi-
tional portions of Lorenzo's testimony and comes to a conclusion that is no-
tably more adamant than the ALJ.58 Specifically, the Commission's deci-
sion concludes that "Lorenzo was well aware that the emails falsely
represented crucial facts about [Waste2Energy] and its debenture offer-
ing."59 It also goes on to state that Lorenzo's "claim that he nevertheless
He just asked me to send out an e-mail for him. I am going to tell him no?") (internal cita-
dons omitted).
52. Id at *7 ("[T]he evidence shows that [Lorenzo] was reckless - although he knew
that [Waste2Energy] was in terrible financial shape, he sent the emails without thinking.").
53. Id.
54. Id. at *8.
55. Id.
56. See id. at *10 (explaining the sanctions imposed on Lorenzo).
57. See SEC Commission Decision, Exchange Release No. 9762, 2015 WL 1927763
(Apr. 29, 2015). The SEC Division of Enforcement cross-appealed, requesting that Lo-
renzo's penalty be raised from $15,000 to $100,000, but was not successful either. See id. at
*17. The SEC's Commission was in part divided along a 3-2 vote, with Commissioners Gal-
lagher and Piwowar concurring with Chair White and Commissioners Aguilar and Stein on
the merits but dissenting with respect to the order of sanctions that placed a lifetime bar on
Lorenzo from the securities industry. Id.
58. See id. at *5-9 (summarizing Lorenzo's testimony).
59. Id. at *9.
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'didn't give sending the emails much thought' is therefore implausible,"
60
adding that, "if Lorenzo did send the emails without 'thinking about it one
way or the other,' as he claims, such a dismissive attitude.. . would be
equally troubling and still constitute acting with extreme recklessness.
61
The SEC Commission also elaborated on the legal theory behind Lo-
renzo's violation of Rule lOb-5. Because Rule lOb-5 sets forth the central
prohibition for securities fraud claims generally and also serves as the key
legal source for Lorenzo's ultimate appeal to the Supreme Court, its three-
part language is worth quoting in full. It provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any
national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact
necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances
under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale
of any security.
62
In applying Rule lOb-5, the Commission determined there are two dis-
tinct legal bases for holding Lorenzo liable.
First, the SEC determined that Lorenzo's conduct ran afoul of Rule lOb-
5's prohibition on false statements laid out in subsection (b) (known in secu-
rities regulation as "misstatements liability"). The lynchpin of the Commis-
sion's conclusion on that point was its interpretation of a 2011 Supreme
Court case, Janus Capital Group v. First Derivative Traders.
63 Janus held that,
with respect to the conduct prohibited under subsection (b), primary liabil-
ity only applies to the individual or entity who "makes" the misstatement.
64
The test for identifying which party has "made" the misleading statement
at issue, the Janus decision further explained, turns on who exercised "ulti-
mate authority" with respect to the statement, meaning that:
For purposes of Rule lOb-5, the maker of a statement is the person or entity with
ultimate authority over the statement, including its content and whether and how to
communicate it. Without control, a person or entity can merely suggest what to say,
not "make" a statement in its own right. One who prepares or publishes a statement
on behalf of another is not its maker.
65
In applying Janus, the Commission addressed and rejected Lorenzo's ar-
60. Id.
61. Id
62. 17 C.F.R. § 240.1Ob-5(a)-(c) (2018).
63. 564 U.S. 135 (2011).
64. See id. at 148 (holding that primary liability falls on the "maker" of the misstate-
ment).
65. Id at 142.
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gument that he was not the "maker" of the statements in the emails, but ra-
ther "merely helped to distribute the statements by sending the email that
Gregg Lorenzo drafted."66 The Commission's decision notes that Lorenzo
provided "at best" conflicting and ambiguous testimony about his role in
drafting the emails.67 And it goes on to find that Lorenzo was the "maker"
of the statements in the two emails he sent because he was "ultimately re-
sponsible for the emails' content and dissemination."
68
Second, the SEC Commission also determined that Lorenzo's conduct
separately constituted a violation of the so-called "scheme liability" prohibi-
tion set forth in subsection (a) and (c) of Rule l0b-5,69 "[i]ndependently" of
whether he could be considered the maker of the misleading statements
sent to Rothe and Goolcharan for purposes of misstatement liability under
Janus.70 In a brief, paragraph-long discussion of the question, the Commis-
sion's decision concludes that "Lorenzo's role in producing and sending the
emails constituted employing a deceptive 'device,' 'act,' or 'artifice to de-
fraud' for purposes of liability under ... Rule lOb-5(a) and (c). .... 71
Lorenzo extended his time in administrative law court slightly by filing a
motion for reconsideration with the SEC, but that motion was denied.
72
He then challenged the SEC Commission's April 2015 decision in federal
court with an appeal to the D.C. Circuit.
C. The D.C. Circuit Opinion
By a 2-1 vote, the D.C. Circuit issued its decision on Lorenzo's appeal
on September 29, 2017.73 The majority opinion, written by Judge Sri
Srinivasan and joined by Judge Thomas Griffith, upheld the SEC Commis-
sion in part, vacated its order of sanctions on Lorenzo, and remanded the
case back to the agency to consider what new penalty would be appropriate
in light of its partial reversal.74 In an extensive dissenting opinion, Judge
Brett Kavanaugh laid out a number of grounds for why the SEC's decision
should have been reversed in full.
75
66. SEC Commission Decision, 2015 WL 1927763, at *10.
67. See id. (noting the ambiguity in the testimony).
68. Id.
69. Scheme liability is discussed in the D.C. Circuit's opinion, and refers to liability un-
der Rule 1 Ob-5(a) and (c) as a result of being involved in a "scheme," rather than liability as
a result of being the "maker" of the statement, as defined in Rule 10b-5(b). See infra Section
I.C and accompanying notes.
70. See SEC Commission Decision, 2015 WL 1927763, at *11.
71. Id.
72. See Lorenzo v. SEC, 872 F.3d 578, 582 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (showing that the motion
for reconsideration was denied).
73. See id. at 578.
74. See id at 578, 580.
75. See id. at 600-02 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (explaining why the order should have
been vacated by the SEC).
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1. The Majority Opinion by Judge Srinivasan
Writing for the D.C. Circuit's majority, Judge Srinivasan upheld the
SEC Commission's decision with respect to its conclusion that Lorenzo was
liable under Section 17, Section 10(b), and the scheme liability provisions in
subsections (a) and (c) of Rule lOb-5. The court also affirmed the SEC's
finding that Lorenzo had sent the two misleading emails with the requisite
scienter for committing securities fraud. On the other hand, the D.C. Cir-
cuit determined that the SEC Commission had erred in its conclusion that
Lorenzo "made" the statements at issue (per the Janus ultimate authority
test), and therefore reversed the agency as to Lorenzo's misstatement liabil-
ity under subsection (b) of Rule 1Ob-5.
a. Lorenzo's Scienter
The majority opinion first addressed the factual question of whether Lo-
renzo had acted with the necessary scienter required for a violation of the
three of the securities fraud provisions in the SEC's charges.
76
At the outset, Judge Srinivasan explained that the SEC Commission's
"factual findings are conclusive if supported by substantial evi-
dence . . . [which] we have repeatedly described ... as a very deferential"
standard.77 The court then proceeded to explain why the SEC's findings
on that point were supported by substantial evidence in the record. After
observing that Lorenzo's testimony to the SEC included a number of con-
flicting statements regarding his mental state that are difficult to reconcile
with one another, Judge Srinivasan states that "[t]he Commission justifi-
ably credited his more inculpatory rendition of events."78 In response to
Lorenzo's procedural objection that the Commission's decision does not
develop the factual record with sufficient specificity, Judge Srinivasan once
again invokes the deferential posture of the D.C. Circuit's review, explain-
ing that "we 'uphold a decision of less than ideal clarity if the agency's path
may be reasonably discerned."'79 The majority opinion therefore leaves the
fact-finding portion of the SEC Commission's decision fully intact.
b. Misstatements Liability
Judge Srinivasan's opinion then turned to the legal issue of Lorenzo's
misstatements liability under Rule lOb-5(b), and whether Lorenzo's chal-
lenge that he did not "make" the statements in the email as that term is in-
76. See id. at 582-83 (citing Dolphin & Bradbury, Inc. v. SEC, 512 F.3d 634, 639 (D.C.
Cir. 2008)) (setting forth the relevant standard for scienter).
77. Id. at 583 (internal quotations omitted).
78. Id. at 584 (stating further that "We perceive no basis for setting aside the Commis-
sion's conclusions as unsupported by substantial evidence.").
79. Id. at 585-86 (quoting Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983)).
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terpreted in Janus.80 In Janus, the Supreme Court held that an investment
advisor firm-which had assisted in the preparation of prospectuses that
were later issued to investors by a separate mutual fund entity on its own
behalf-lacked primary liability under 1 Ob-5(b) because the advisory entity
did not itself make the statements therein.8 1 As applied to the emails that
were drafted and sent by Charles Vista, the D.C. Circuit found that Lo-
renzo played an ancillary role that was analogous to the advisory firm in
Janus, and that it was the boss, Gregg Lorenzo, who exercised ultimate au-
thority over the receipt of those statements by Rothe and Goolcharan.
82
In departing from the SEC's contrary conclusion on this point, the D.C.
Circuit emphasized that the Commission Decision relied on a single piece
of Lorenzo's testimony, in which he referred to himself as the author of the
emails but in a slightly equivocal manner.8 3 Against that quasi-admission,
Judge Srinivasan's opinion noted the multiple times that Lorenzo consist-
ently testified to having done no more than "cut and paste []" the email that
Gregg Lorenzo drafted and then sending it out, as asked, "at the request of
my superior."84 The majority opinion also dismissed the significance which
the SEC Commission attached to Lorenzo's name appearing on the emails,
explaining that "[t]hat sort of signature line ... can often exist when one
person sends an email that 'publishes a statement on behalf of another."'
85
In summing up its analysis, the D.C. Circuit stated that Gregg Lorenzo
had "ultimate authority over the substance and distribution of the emails:
Gregg Lorenzo asked Lorenzo to send the emails, supplied the central con-
tent, and approved the messages for distribution. '86 The D.C. Circuit's re-
versal of the Commission on this point also motivates the vacatur of Lo-
renzo's sanctions that is announced at the close of its decision. The
rationale, as Judge Srinivasan writes, is that the court has "no assurance
that the Commission would have imposed the same level of penalties in the
absence of its finding of liability for making false statements under Rule
10b-5(b)."87
80. See id. at 583-88 (comparing Lorenzo's activities to those in Janus).
81. SeeJanus Capital Grp., Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 564 U.S. 135, 148 (2011).
82. See Lorenzo, 872 F.3d at 587 ("[W]e find that Lorenzo was not the 'maker' of the
pertinent statements set out in the email messages he sent to potential investors, even view-
ing the record in the light most favorable to the Commission.... We cannot sustain the
Commission's conclusion that Lorenzo had 'ultimate authority' over the false statements
under Janus. Gregg Lorenzo, and not Lorenzo, retained ultimate authority.") (internal cita-
tions omitted).
83. See id. (explaining the basis of the SEC decision).
84. Id.
85. Id. at 588.
86. Id. at 587-89 (concluding that the person with ultimate authority "was Gregg Lo-
renzo, and not (or not also) Lorenzo").




The final portion of the D.C. Circuit's substantive analysis is an exten-
sive discussion of why the SEC Commission was correct to find Lorenzo
liable for perpetrating a deceptive "scheme" under subsections (a) and (c) of
Rule 1Ob-5.88 More specifically, much of that discussion is directed at (re-
jecting) Lorenzo's contention that-if he did not "make" any misleading
statement for purposes of subsection (b), it logically follows that he cannot
be liable for participating in a scheme to deceive the Charles Vista clients
who received his emails.89
In support of its conclusion, Judge Srinivasan's majority opinion argues
that, although Lorenzo was not legally the maker of misstatements, he
nonetheless played an active role in "producing" and "vouch[ing] for" the
emails in the course of "directly" sending and "conveying" them to
Waste2Energy's investors.90 Taking a largely textualist approach that fo-
cuses on the plain meaning of the language found in subsections (a) and
(c)-which refers to "employing" an "artifice" or "device" and "engaging"
in deceptive conduct91-the D.C. Circuit decision states that "Lorenzo's
conduct fits comfortably within the ordinary understanding of those
terms,"'92 which "readily encompass[] [his] actions."
93
Judge Srinivasan also counters Lorenzo's argument regarding the broad-
er structure of Rule 1Ob-5. To that end, the majority opinion stakes out the
view that the coverage of subsections relating to misstatements liability and
scheme liability "may overlap in certain respects.'94 The majority opinion
further references a number of lower court opinions which, it argues, stand
for the proposition that "securities-fraud allegations involving misstate-
ments can give rise to liability under related provisions even if the conduct
in question does not amount to 'making' a statement under Janus."95 Judge
Srinivasan succinctly explains the nub of the D.C. Circuit's ruling on
scheme liability: "[w] e know of no blanket reason ... to treat the various
provisions [of Rule 1Ob-5] as occupying mutually exclusive territory, such
88. See id. at 588-95 (explaining why the court agreed with the SEC decision).
89. See id. at 590 (rejecting any argument that Lorenzo was not the maker of the e-
mails).
90. Id. at 589-91.
91. See supra note 62 and accompanying text (quoting the three subsections of Rule lOb-
5 in full).
92. Lorenzo, 872 F.3d at 589.
93. Id. at 590-91 (distinguishing Lorenzo's conduct from that performed by the adviso-
ry firm in Janus, along with another recent Supreme Court case, Stoneridge Invest. Partners,
LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148 (2008)).
94. Id. at 591 (citing Chadbourne & Parke LLP v. Troice, 571 U.S. 377 (2014)).
95. Id. at 592 (citing SEC v. Big Apple Consulting USA, Inc., 783 F.3d 786, 795-96
(11 th Cir. 2015); SEC v. Monterosso, 756 F.3d 1326, 1334 (1 1th Cir. 2014); SEC v. Benger,
931 F.Supp.2d 904, 905-06 (N.D. Ill. 2013); SEC v. Familant, 910 F.Supp.2d 83, 93-95
(D.D.C. 2012); SEC v. Stoker, 865 F.Supp.2d 457, 464-65 (S.D.N.Y. 2012)).
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that false-statement cases must reside exclusively within the province of
Rule 10b-5(b)."96
2. The Dissenting Opinion by Judge Kavanaugh
Judge Kavanaugh's dissent opens with the rhetorical engine running at
full speed. Its headline conclusion: that Lorenzo should not be liable under
any of the three subsections of Rule 1Ob-5 because he merely passed on a
message from the boss to the clients.9 7 Judge Kavanaugh then takes a shot
at the excessive severity of Lorenzo's sanction: "According to the
SEC ... in essence forwarding emails after being told to do so by your
boss-warrants a lifetime suspension from the securities profession, on top of a
monetary fine." 98 The final target of the dissent's prefatory remarks is the
D.C. Circuit's majority decision, which Judge Kavanaugh characterizes as
"invoking a standard of deference that, as applied here, seems akin to a
standard of 'hold your nose to avoid the stink." ' 99
The body of the dissent lays out an extensive line of argument in support
of these claims, while also touching on larger themes about the proper rela-
tionship between federal courts and administrative adjudication. In literal
dramatic fashion, Judge Kavanaugh gives his take on the full procedural
history of the case, restating it in the form of a three-act play. "Act 1" of
the dissent covers the ALJ decision, "Act 2" discusses the SEC Commis-
sion's ruling on Lorenzo's appeal from the ALJ, and "Act 3" turns to the
majority opinion ofJudge Srinivasan.
a. Act 1: The Administrative Law Judge: "Mens Rea 101"
Judge Kavanaugh sets the stage for his drama by declaring that the pro-
ceedings before Lorenzo's ALJ were "not your usual trial." 100
For starters, the dissent finds it "surprisingf" that the SEC did not ad-
duce testimony from Gregg Lorenzo or anyone else besides Lorenzo at its
hearing in September 2013.101 Judge Kavanaugh then questions the ALJ's
interpretation of Lorenzo's testimony to the SEC, stating that "[t] he admin-
istrative law judge's factual findings and legal conclusions do not square
up."'102 According to the dissent, "[t]hose factual findings were very favor-
able to Lorenzo and should have cleared Lorenzo of any serious wrongdo-
ing under the securities laws. At most, the judge's factual findings may
have shown some mild negligence on Lorenzo's part."10 3 For Judge Ka-
96. Id at 591.
97. See id. at 596-97 (Kavanaugh,J., dissenting).
98. Id
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vanaugh, there is really only one possible reading of the factual record for
purposes of Lorenzo's scienter, calling it "Mens Rea 101" that "[i]f Lorenzo
did not draft the emails, did not think about the contents of the emails, and
sent the emails only at the behest of his boss, it is impossible to find that Lo-
renzo acted 'willfully."" 1
04
The dissent does not stop there. "The administrative law judge's deci-
sion in this case contravenes basic due process," it states, because "[a] find-
ing that a defendant possessed the requisite mens rea is essential to preserving
individual liberty."105 And, by failing "Scienter 101," "[t]he administrative
law judge's opinion in this case did not heed those bedrock mens rea princi-
ples."106 Act 1 of the dissent closes by concluding that, "[g]iven the judge's
pro-Lorenzo findings of fact, a legal conclusion that Lorenzo 'willfully' vio-
lated the securities laws makes a hash of the term 'willfully,' and of the
deeply rooted principle that punishment must correspond to blameworthi-
ness based on the defendant's mens rea." 107 As Act 1 makes apparent, Judge
Kavanaugh sees much more hanging in the balance with Lorenzo's appeal
than the technical niceties of securities law doctrine.
b. Act 2: The SEC Commission: "So Much For A Fair Trial"
The tone set in Act 1 does not let up for the remainder of the dissent.
"Fast forward to the Securities and Exchange Commission," begins Act
2.108 "Surely the Commission would realize that the administrative law
judge's factual findings did not support the judge's legal conclusions and
sanctions?"10 9 Judge Kavanaugh's answer to his own question immediately
follows:
And indeed, the Commission did come to that realization. But instead of vacating the
order against Lorenzo, the Commission did something quite different and quite
remarkable. In a Houdini-like move, the Commission rewrote the administrative law
judge's factual findings to make those factual findings correspond to the legal
conclusion that Lorenzo was guilty and deserving of a lifetime suspension. 
1 10
The Commission's rewrite of the ALJ's factual conclusions was unwar-
ranted, according to the dissent, because the ALJ "reached those conclu-
sions only after hearing Lorenzo testify and assessing his credibility in per-
son.""' Given the ALJ's closer proximity to the factual record, it was
especially troubling that the Commission "simply swept the judge's factual
104. Id.
105. Id. at 598 (citing Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246 (1952)) (emphasis add-
ed).
106. Id. (emphasis added).
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and credibility findings under the rug."' 12
The dissent's stinging final assessment of the Commission's performance
on the question of Lorenzo's scienter is also worthy of a quotation in full.
AsJudge Kavanaugh writes:
The Commission's handiwork in this case is its own debacle. Faced with
inconvenient factual findings that would make it hard to uphold the sanctions against
Lorenzo, the Commission-without hearing any testimony-simply manufactured a
new assessment of Lorenzo's credibility and rewrote the judge's factual findings. 113
The closing remark for Act 2: "So much for a fair trial." 114
c. Act 3: The Majority Opinion: Falling for the SEC's "Legal Jujitsu"
Act 3 opens peaceably enough. "Fast forward to this Court. To its cred-
it... the majority opinion.., vacates the grossly excessive lifetime suspen-
sion of Lorenzo and sends the case back to the SEC for reconsideration of
the appropriate penalties. So far, so good."115 Then things quickly take a
more critical turn. The dissent identifies two separate grounds for its disa-
greement withJudge Srinivasan's majority opinion.
First, Judge Kavanaugh parts ways with the majority's ruling on the
question of scienter. The main critique here is that the "majority opinion
does not heed the administrative law judge's factual conclusions," and in-
stead "relies on the SEC's alternative facts, which the SEC devised on its
own without hearing from any witnesses."116 This represents a mistaken
application of administrative law doctrine, the dissent argues, because "an
agency does not have carte blanche to rewrite an administrative law judge's
factual determinations. Rather, an agency must act reasonably when it dis-
regards an administrative law judge's factual findings." ' 1 7 The D.C. Cir-
cuit's decision therefore conflicts with whatJudge Kavanaugh describes as a
black-letter law principle on this point, since "the SEC had no reasonable
basis to run roughshod over the administrative law judge's findings of fact
and credibility assessments."'118 In an allusion to the "very deferential"
standard of review adopted by Judge Srinivasan's majority opinion, the dis-
sent's rebuttal on scienter closes by stating in pointed fashion that the SEC's
exercise of discretion in that respect "deserves judicial repudiation, not ju-
112. Id




117. Id. at 599-600 (citing RONALD M. LEVIN &JEFFREY S. LUBBERS, ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW AND PROCESS: IN A NUTSHELL 101 (6th ed. 2017)) (explaining that "here is the key
principle that speaks directly to this case: 'When the case turns on eyewitness testimo-
ny... the initial decision should be given considerable weight: the ALJ was able to observe




dicial deference or respect."' 19
Second, the dissent disagrees with the majority opinion's application of
the scheme liability provisions in Rule 10b-5. Judge Kavanaugh asserts
that the D.C. Circuit's decision "creates a circuit split by holding that mere
misstatements, standing alone, may constitute the basis for so-called scheme
liability."' 120 The consensus among other circuit courts of appeals, as un-
derstood in the dissent, is that "scheme liability must be based on conduct
that goes beyond a defendant's role in preparing misstatements or omis-
sions made by others."'121 Requiring that such conduct takes place is im-
portant, Judge Kavanaugh writes, because "[o] therwise, the SEC would be
able to evade the important statutory distinction between primary and sec-
ondary (aiding and abetting) liability." 1
22
Moving beyond the immediate misapplication of Rule 1 Ob-5 that Judge
Kavanaugh sees in the majority opinion, the dissent goes on to place a large
part of the blame for that alleged legal error at the feet of the SEC. In fact,
the dissent argues that Lorenzo is but the latest attempt of the SEC to distort
the coherence of securities regulation jurisprudence on a more or less
wholesale basis. The complete bill of particulars is this:
The distinction between primary and secondary liability matters, particularly for
private securities lawsuits. For decades, however, the SEC has tried to erase that
distinction so as to expand the scope of primary liability under the securities laws. For
decades, the Supreme Court has pushed back hard against the SEC's attempts to
unilaterally rewrite the law.... Still undeterred in the wake of that body of Supreme
Court precedent, the SEC has continued to push the envelope and has tried to
circumvent those Supreme Court decisions.... I agree with the other courts that
have rejected the SEC's persistent efforts to end-run the Supreme Court. I therefore
respectfully disagree with the majority opinion [.] 123
Thus, from a bigger picture perspective on the scheme liability issue in
Lorenzo, Judge Kavanaugh's dissent paints the D.C. Circuit as an unwitting
victim of SEC's trademark "kind of legal jujitsu."1
24
Judge Kavanaugh's final point concerns a critique about administrative
adjudication in general, and is emblematic of his overall theory about the
administrative state.125 He acknowledges that the agency-centric process is
in tension with the due process clause and the right to a jury trial. 26 He
119. Id. at 599-600.
120. Id. at 600.
121. Id. at 600-01 (citing Pub. Pension Fund Grp. v. KV Pharm. Co., 679 F.3d 972,
987 (8th Cir. 2012); WPP Luxembourg Gamma Three Sarl v. Spot Runner, Inc., 655 F.3d
1039, 1057 (9th Cir. 2011); Lentell v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 396 F.3d 161, 177 (2d Cir.
2005)).
122. Id. at 601.
123. Id. (internal citations omitted).
124. Id.
125. See infra Section I.C.2.
126. Lorenzo, 872 F.3d at 602.
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writes, "[t]hat tension is exacerbated when, as here, the agency's political
appointees-without hearing from any witnesses-disregard an administra-
tive law judge's factual findings."'127 Because of this structural setup, Judge
Kavanaugh asserts, Lorenzo, though he may not "tug at the judicial heart-
strings" nevertheless did not receive a fair process. 128
Judge Kavanaugh's presentation of his dissent in the mold of a tragic
drama may appear to be a bit over-stylized for a judicial opinion. But it is
also revealing of his overall attitude toward the case. As the dissenting
opinion clearly reflects, this is not merely a series of objections about ob-
scure matters of securities regulation doctrine. Instead, it would be fair to
say that Judge Kavanaugh views Lorenzo as a familiar, worrying tale ofjudi-
cial abdication (Act 3) in the face of bureaucratic malfeasance (Acts 1 & 2).
The dramatic format is his vehicle for telling the tale. As will be shown,
that narrative is not specific to the idiosyncratic facts of Lorenzo. Rather,
Judge Kavanaugh's rebuke of the ALJ process, the SEC, and the majority
opinion in his dissent is a microcosm of his signature critique of the current
state of the law as a whole.129
III. SECURITIES FRAUD UNDER RULE 1 OB-5 AFTER LORENZO
In order to avoid sitting in judgment of his own lower court decision,
Justice Kavanaugh formally recused himself from the case on October 19.
Thus, an initial curiosity of Lorenzo arises from the obvious procedural com-
plications that an eight-Justice vote entails.
More substantively, another interesting aspect of the case is that it may
be resolved on any number of grounds, and it is far from clear at this point
which of those the Court will choose. Perhaps the most straightforward op-
tion is to simply uphold the D.C. Circuit's decision in full, according to the
same rationale as was articulated in Judge Srinivasan's majority opinion.
But a wide menu of plausible alternative rulings remains, many of which
are previewed in the multi-pronged critique served up in Judge Ka-
vanaugh's dissent. As detailed below, the various alternate grounds for re-
solving Lorenzo which appear in that dissent fall along a spectrum, from
relatively narrow to aggressive and sweeping. The future of securities fraud
doctrine under Rule 1Ob-5 hinges on whether any of those theories are
well-received by the other eightJustices at the Court.
This Section analyzes the road to a Supreme Court decision in Lorenzo
and the case's broader significance for the law of securities fraud. Part A
reviews arguments that the parties have thus far presented to the Court in
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. See infra Section I.
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their briefing on Lorenzo's Petition for a Writ of Certiorari (Cert Petition). Part
B surveys the possible legal theories that the Court may rely upon in order
to resolve the case. Part C closes with some speculation as to what the out-
come of Lorenzo may be when the Court issues its decision in 2019.
A. The Parties' Briefing to the Supreme Court
One of the best indicators of the path that the Court may take in resolv-
ing Lorenzo can be found in the parties' own briefings of the case to the Jus-
tices, particularly Lorenzo's Cert Petition.130 Presumably, the Court select-
ed the case from its vast pool of annual cert petitions because at least four of
the Justices found one of the legal questions presented in that briefing to be
compelling.13 1 A review of those briefs is therefore a key entry point for
identifying the parameters of debate when the case is heard by the Court.
Lorenzo's opening brief in support of his petition to the Court frames the
legal question on appeal in the following terms:
The question presented is whether a misstatement claim that does not meet the
elements set forth in Janus can be repackaged and pursued as a fraudulent scheme
claim. The Circuits have split 3-2 on this question. The Second, Eighth and Ninth
Circuits have held that a misstatement alone cannot be the basis of a fraudulent
scheme claim, while the DC Circuit and the Eleventh Circuit have held that a
misstatement standing alone can be the basis of a fraudulent scheme claim. 
13 2
Although this language highlights the presence of a circuit split, Lo-
renzo's petition is more about the split within the D.C. Circuit in his case,
between Judge Srinivasan's majority opinion and Judge Kavanaugh's dis-
sent. In fact, the Cert Petition references Judge Kavanaugh, or otherwise
cites to his dissent, on no less than seventeen occasions.133 As its extensive
reliance on that dissent makes clear, the grounds for petitioning the Su-
preme Court are essentially one and the same as the grounds for reversing
the SEC Commission, which Judge Kavanaugh laid out in the court of ap-
peals.
Lorenzo's briefing first repeats Judge Kavanaugh's contention that the
D.C. Circuit erred in finding Lorenzo's conduct satisfied the standard for
130. See generally Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Lorenzo v. SEC, No. 17-1077 (U.S.
Jan. 26, 2018) [hereinafter Cert. Pet.]; Brief for Respondent in Opposition, Lorenzo, No. 17-
1077 (U.S. May 2, 2018) [hereinafter SEC Cert. Opp.]; Reply Brief for Petitioner in Sup-
port of Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Lorenzo, No. 17-1077 (U.S. May 23, 2018) [hereinaf-
ter Lorenzo Reply iso Cert. Pet.].
131. See Adam Bonica, Adam Chilton, & Maya Sen, The "Odd Party Out" Theory of




Certiorari.pdf (providing a survey of common explanations for what motivates the Court's
cert decisions).
132. Cert. Pet., supra note 130, at L
133. Id. at 5, 5 n.1, 9 (twice), 10 (twice), 11 (four times), 12 (five times), 13, & 28.
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scheme liability under Rule 1Ob-5(a) and (C).13 4 The Cert Petition further
argues that the scope of scheme liability for securities fraud is an important
question for the Court to address more generally by expanding on the as-
sertion, proposed in Judge Kavanaugh's dissent, that there is a split among
the circuit court of appeals on this point.135 According to Lorenzo, one side
of that split consists a "majority view," espoused by the Second, Eight, and
Ninth Circuit, which holds that scheme liability requires conduct beyond
the mere making of misstatements that would otherwise trigger liability un-
der Rule lOb-5(b).136 On the other side is a "minority view," embraced by
both the Eleventh Circuit and, after Judge Srinivasan's opinion, the D.C.
Circuit.137 Lorenzo's briefing also picks up on the claim in Judge Ka-
vanaugh's dissent that his treatment within the agency adjudicatory system
was so procedurally flawed that it violated his due process rights.3 8 Finally,
the Cert Petition closes by suggesting that the SEC would be standing on
much firmer legal ground had it chosen to charge him for aiding and abet-
ting the frauds of Charles Vista under Section 20(e) of the Exchange Act,
rather than pursuing a theory of primary liability under Rule I 0b-5.139
The SEC's opposition briefing to the Court closely tracks the rationale
provided in judge Srinivasan's majority opinion.140 On the question of sci-
enter, it focuses on Lorenzo's ambiguous testimony to the ALJ, and argues
that he later "disavowed" the more exculpatory aspects of those statements
in his appellate briefing to the D.C. Circuit.141 The SEC defends the view
134. Id at 23-32 (claiming that "[t]he DC Circuit's [d]ecision is [w]rong").
135. Id at 13-14 (alleging a circuit split); id. at 21-23 (explaining why that circuit split is
a significant source of confusion for the lower courts and arguing that Lorenzo's case pre-
sents "an ideal vehicle to resolve the circuit split").
136. Id. at 17 20 (citing Lentell v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 396 F.3d 161, 177 (2d Cir.
2005); SEC v. Kelley, 817 F. Supp. 2d 340, 343-44 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); WPP Luxembourg
Gamma Three Sarl v. Spot Runner, Inc., 655 F.3d 1039 (9th Cir. 2011); Desai v. Deutsche
Bank Sec., Ltd., 573 F.3d 931, 939 (9th Cir. 2009)).
137. Id at 20-21 (citing SEC v. Big Apple Consulting USA, Inc., 783 F.3d 786 (11 th
Cir. 2015); SEC v. Monterosso, 756 F.3d 1326, 1334 (11 th Cir. 2014)).
138. See Lorenzo Reply iso Cert. Pet., supra note 130, at 7 8 (citing Lorenzo and quoting
dissenting opinion ofJudge Kavanaugh).
139. Cert. Pet., supra note 130, at 27-28 ("While Lorenzo would have factual defenses
to an SEC action for aiding and abetting, such a claim would not have raised any of the
problematic legal questions that are the subject of this petition.").
140. SEC Cert. Opp., supra note 130, at i ("Question Presented: Whether, in an en-
forcement proceeding brought by the Securities and Exchange Commission, a person who
knowingly disseminates false or misleading statements in connection with a securities trans-
action can be found to have violated Section 17(a)(1) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C.
77q(a)(1) (2006); Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. 78j(b)
(2006); and Rule 1Ob-5(a) and (c), 17 C.F.R. 240.1Ob-5(a) and (c), even if the person does not
'make' false or misleading statements for purposes of Rule 1Ob-5(b), 17 C.F.R. 240.1Ob-
5(b).").
141. Seeid. at 15-16.
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that the D.C. Circuit's decision does not undermine the Court's opinion in
Janus, as Lorenzo claims, but rather is entirely consistent with the holding
in that case.142 The heart of the SEC's argument, however, is that the D.C.
Circuit got the relationship between scheme and misstatement liability
right. In doing so, it follows Judge Srinivasan's conclusion that Lorenzo's
conduct "fits comfortably within the ordinary understanding" of Rule lOb-
5, and further explains why a finding of liability is supported by the back-
ground history and purpose of the rule's prohibition on securities fraud.
143
A final theme of the SEC's briefing is to emphasize the overlap between the
three subsections of Rule lOb-5 and to provide further support for Judge
Srinivasan's point that those provisions do not occupy "mutually exclusive
territory." 144
The SEC's briefing also presents a number of arguments to the effect
that, aside from the merits of Lorenzo, the case is a poor vehicle for courts to
weigh in with its interpretation of Rule 1Ob-5. First, the SEC argues that,
regardless of how the scienter issue should be decided, it is a minor, fact-
specific question that does not warrant the Court's review.1
4 5 Second, the
SEC claims that the circuit split which Lorenzo's petition attempts to draw
out is either non-existent or greatly overstated.146 Third, the SEC pushes
back on the Cert Petition's assertion that the D.C. Circuit's Lorenzo decision
"will open the door to private suits"-by identifying a number of height-
ened procedural hurdles that apply to private securities plaintiffs which seek
to plead a claim under Rule lOb-5.147 Lastly, the SEC claims that the
142. Id. at 13-14 (discussing Janus).
143. See id at 9 (citing Lorenzo v. SEC, 872 F.3d 578, 589 (D.C. Cir. 2017)). The brief
also cites several Supreme Court cases that note that the plain meaning of Rule lOb-5's text
controls its interpretation and that the history and purpose of Rule 1 Ob-5 favors a broad in-
terpretation of its provisions. See id. at 10.
144. Id. at 11-12 (quoting Judge Srinivasan and citing other precedent o show that the
SEC has not always "explicitly distinguish[ed] between subsections [when] finding violations
of Rule lOb-5").
145. Id at 16 ("In any event, a fact-specific dispute about the adequacy of the mental-
state evidence in this case would not present any question of general importance warranting
this Court's review.").
146. Id at 8 ("Petitioner also contends that the courts of appeals are divided over
whether conduct like his is actionable under the securities laws. But petitioner does not
identify any conflict over the scope of liability under Section 17(a)(1).") (internal citations
omitted); id. at 17-18 ("With respect to [the alleged circuit split over] Section 10(b) and Rule
lOb-5(a) and (c)... all the cases that petitioner cites were initiated by private plaintiffs rather
than by the Commission. That distinction is significant because different statutory and other
standards govern private securities-fraud actions."); id at 17 ("Petitioner identifies no sound
reason to believe that any other circuit would have reached a different result under the cir-
cumstances presented here.").
147. Id. at 16-19 (explaining that these include heightened pleading standards et forth
in the Private Securities Litigation Act of 1995 (PSLRA), along with additional elements that
private litigants must plead in order to state a claim, such as reliance and loss causation); see
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Court's review of the case would be inappropriate in light of what it de-
scribes as the interlocutory status of Lorenzo's appeal: technically, Lo-
renzo's case before the Commission is still ongoing, since the D.C. Circuit
ordered the vacatur and reconsideration of his administrative sanctions,
which have yet to be finalized. 148
Despite the SEC's best efforts in its briefing, the Court granted Lorenzo's
petition on June 18, 2018.149 As of the time of this writing, the Court's re-
view of the case is more or less complete. Oral argument was held at the
Court before the eight presiding Justices on December 3.150 A decision
must be handed down, at latest, by the close of the Court's October 2018
Term onJune 20, 2019.151
B. Potential Legal Resolutions
The D.C. Circuit's decision can be summarized as turning on three cen-
tral components: (1) the conclusion that Lorenzo did not "make" the mis-
statements at issue for purposes of fraud liability under Rule lOb-5(b), as
determined by application of the "ultimate authority" test announced in
Janus; (2) a determination that Lorenzo's emailing of those misstatements is
conduct sufficient to satisfy the requirements for scheme liability under
Rule lOb-5(a),(c); and (3) a finding that Lorenzo acted with the requisite
scienter for liability under those same scheme liability provisions.152 The
Court's disposition of this trio of issues effectively covers the full range of
possible legal resolutions to Lorenzo.
1. Scenario #1: Agency Fact-Finding Under the Microscope
Perhaps the most limited grounds for reversing the D.C. Circuit would
be to follow the line of reasoning in Judge Kavanaugh's dissent which ar-
gued that the SEC simply failed to meet its burden of proof as to whether
Lorenzo knowingly or even recklessly defrauded Waste2Energy's investors
also Private Securities Litigation Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 739 (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4 (2012)); Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United States, 406
U.S. 128, 152 54 (1972) (providing an early articulation of the reliance elements); Dura
Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 342 (2005) (discussing the "economic loss" and "loss
causation" pleading requirements for private securities fraud plaintiffs).
148. Cert. Pet., supra note 130, at 20.
149. Order Granting Certiorari, supra note 14.
150. Marcia Coyle, Brett Kavanaugh Recuses From Three Upcoming SCOTUS Arguments, THE
NAT'L LJ. (Oct. 19, 2018), https://www.law.com/nationallawjournal/2018/10/19/brett-
kavanaugh-recuses-from-three-upcoming-scotus-arguments/?slreturn 20181017150354
(explaining thatJustice Kavanaugh will sit out of three cases, including Lorenzo v. SEC).
151. See Search Results: No. 17-1077, U.S. SUP. CT., https://www.supremecourt.
gov/search.aspx?filename=/docket/docketfiles/html/public/ 17-1077.html (last visited Feb.
27, 2019).
152. See supra Section I.C.1.
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when sending his two emails.153 As the SEC intimates in its cert petition
briefing, if the Court were to take such an approach, it would not really be
opining on any open legal question concerning Rule 1Ob-5-or anywhere
else in securities law.154 Instead, it would be eyeballing a (admittedly intri-
guing) set of facts and agreeing whether or not they reflect a subjective in-
tent to deceive on Lorenzo's part. Although the D.C. Circuit could be
overturned as a result, not much of that eyeballing exercise would be trans-
ferrable to other securities regulation disputes going forward.
Yet the scienter issue may also be resolved on a number of further
grounds that are by no means narrow. On a more fundamental level, the
SEC's determination implicates the allocation of fact-finding authority
among frontline ALJs and higher rungs of the agency hierarchy. Contrary
to the standard procedure in federal court, the relevant appellate body
within an agency has discretion to substitute its own findings of fact for that
of the ALJ. 155 And in Lorenzo, the SEC Commission leveraged its authority
to do just that.156 But, as Judge Kavanaugh's dissent contends, there may
be circumstances where a departure from the black letter standard of unfet-
tered discretion is recognized as inappropriate.
157 Thus, should the Court
wade into a revision of the D.C. Circuit's conclusion regarding scienter, it
need not restrict itself to the factual dimensions of that question. It could
also intervene either for or against Judge Kavanaugh's interpretation on
this broader issue of ALJ fact-finding relating to witness credibility.
The import ofJudge Kavanaugh's dissent for the Court's resolution on
Lorenzo's scienter does not stop there. An even weightier issue turns on the
degree of deference that federal courts of appeal must grant administrative
fact-finding, whether by an ALJ or by the agency's higher-level reviewing
authority.158 As Judge Srinivasan's majority opinion recognizes, the "sub-
stantial evidence" standard that applies in those contexts represents one of
the more deferential forms of judicial review vis-a-vis agency action that
153. See Lorenzo v. SEC, 872 F.3d 578, 596 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (Kavanaugh,J., dissent-
ing).
154. See SEC Cert. Opp., supra note 130, at 16.
155. See Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 557(b) (2012); Universal Camera
Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 492 (1951); cf. KEITH WERHAN, PRINCIPLES OF
ADMINISTRATIVE LAw 223-25 (2d ed. 2014) (providing an overview of administrative re-
view of ALJ decisions, including review of findings of fact).
156. See Lorenzo, 872 F.3d at 593.
157. See id. at 599-600 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting). Notably, internal agency guidance
at the SEC already places some modest, self-imposed limits on the circumstances in which
the Commission is able to set aside factual findings of the ALJ. See SEC R. PRAC. 411 (a), (d)
(2018); see also Bandimere, Exchange Act Release No. 33-9512, 108 SEC Docket 4 (Jan. 16,
2014) (discussing the application of Rule 411).
158. See Lorenzo, 872 F.3d at 593 (explaining why this is a separate question and arguing
that it has not been properly raised on appeal by Lorenzo).
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appears in administrative law. 159 Thus, by proposing to overturn the SEC's
finding of scienter, Judge Kavanaugh's dissent is also indirectly inviting the
Court to reassess the bounds of the substantial evidence standard. If it were
to take up that invitation, the Court would be announcing that the standard
is not so unbendingly deferential as may often be thought.
Lastly, and most broadly of all, Judge Kavanaugh's dissent casts doubt
on the procedural mechanisms that generated the SEC's scienter conclusion
in the first place. For example, with skepticism over the way that the SEC
conducted Lorenzo's hearing, which, as the Cert Petition highlights, Judge
Kavanaugh interpreted as a contravention of "basic due process."'160 This
essentially raises the legitimacy of agency adjudication-full stop. Typical-
ly, the use of such rhetoric in an appellate brief could be brushed aside as a
detour into hyperbole. But that is not the case in light of the Court's recent
decisions, in particular Lucia v. SEC,161 decided just last term.162 In Lucia,
the Court held the SEC's entire ALJ apparatus to be unconstitutional, albe-
it for slightly technical reasons relating to procedural irregularities in the
ALJ appointment process.163 Given Judge Kavanaugh's dissent, Lorenzo
might be seen as a vehicle to extend the constitutional inquiry ventured in
Lucia to other basic aspects of the administrative adjudicatory process.164
159. Administrative Procedure Act § 706(2)(E); Universal Camera, 340 U.S. at 478-79; see
also Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78y(a)(4) (2012) (providing that the Com-
mission's findings of fact are to be reviewed by federal courts pursuant to a substantial evi-
dence standard); cf RICHARD J. PIERCE, Jr., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 40-42 (2d ed. 2012)
(providing an overview of the substantial evidence standard). Technically, the decision of
the SEC to substitute its own findings of fact (apart from than the findings themselves) is re-
viewable on appeal in federal courts under a distinct, arbitrary and capricious standard.
Administrative Procedure Act § 706(2)(A) (providing governing legal standard for arbitrary
and capriciousness review); see also Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983) (articulating a leading judicial gloss on the APA's statutory lan-
guage for arbitrary and capricious review); Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe,
401 U.S. 402, 413-14 (1971) (same). But the two standards do not differ much, or at all, as
applied in practice. See Ass'n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Bd. of Governors, 745 F.2d
677, 683-84 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (holding that judicial review under a substantial evidence or
arbitrary and capricious test is functionally the same).
160. See Cert. Pet., supra note 130, at 12.
161. 138 S. Ct. 2044 (2018).
162. See, e.g., id.
163. Id at 2055 (holding that the selection of SEC ALJs is inconsistent with require-
ments set forth in of the Appointments Clause found in U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2).
164. Cf Christopher J. Walker, Constitutional Tensions in Agency Adjudication, 104 IOWA L.
REV. (forthcoming 2019) (surveying a number of open questions in that area); John Gibbons,
Why Judicial Deference to Administrative Fact-Finding Is Unconstitutional, 2016 BYU L. REV. 1485,
1487 (2017) (providing a skeptical view on the constitutionality of agency adjudication).
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2. Scenario #2: TheJanus "Ultimate Authority" Test Revisited
A pervasive view in the early commentary on Lorenzo seems to be that it
has teed up a dramatic replay of Janus.165 However the relevance of Janus is
not as straightforward as it may appear at first glance. For one, Justice
Thomas's opinion for the majority in that case does not discuss the relation-
ship between scheme liability and misstatement liability that ultimately
drove a wedge between the D.C. Circuit panel in Lorenzo.
166 Moreover,
both sides of the D.C. Circuit decision are in full agreement that the SEC
committed reversible legal error for its failure to properly apply the "ulti-
mate authority" test articulated in Janus.16 7 That said, there are a few ap-
proaches that the Court could take in Lorenzo which would allow its review
of the D.C. Circuit to become an occasion for reaffirming, extending, or
cutting back on the ruling in Janus.
One possibility is a partial reversal of the D.C. Circuit's decision, based
on a determination that Lorenzo did in fact "make" the false statements at
issue. The most direct way to do so would be to embrace some version of
the alternative test proposed by Justice Breyer's dissent in Janus, which sug-
gested that the "specific relationships alleged among" the parties associated
with a false statement should provide the relevant basis for evaluating
which actor or actors "made" it.168 But even taking the "ultimate authori-
ty" test in Janus as a given, dicta in Justice Thomas's majority opinion,
which provides a gloss on that test, maps awkwardly onto the facts in Lo-
renzo. The underlying problem is that-despite prefatory language which
states that the ultimate authority test applies to both "persons or entities"-
the way that test is fleshed out feels tailored to the financial firms at issue in
Janus and does not necessarily fit with cases where natural persons are
charged for making a false statement rather than legal entities. 1
69
165. See, e.g., Daphne Morduchowitz et al., Awaiting Supreme Court Clarification on Fraudu-
lent Scheme Claims, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOV'T. & FiN. REG. (July 20, 2018),
https: / /corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/07 /20/awaiting-supreme-court-clarification-on-
fraudulent-scheme-claims/ ("The Supreme Court's decision to review this case implicates
the scope and applicability of its decision in Janus[.]"); Roger Cooper et al., Lorenzo v. SEC:
Will High Court Further Curtail Rule 1Ob-5?, LAW360 (July 18, 2018),
https: / /www.law360.com/articles/ 1064288.
166. Indeed, at no point in that opinion is there an acknowledgement that such a dis-
tinction exists, or that Rule lOb-5 contains multiple subsections. SeeJanus Capital Grp., Inc.
v. First Derivative Traders, 564 U.S. 135, 137-38 (2018) ("Rule lOb-5 prohibits 'making
any untrue statement of a material fact' in connection with the purchase or sale of securities.
17 CFR § 240.10b-5 (2010).")
167. See Lorenzo v. SEC, 872 F.3d 578, 580, 599 (D.C. Cir. 2017).
168. See Janus, 564 U.S. at 158 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (setting forth the four dissenting
Justices' proposed alternative test); see also id. at 144 (majority opinion) (identifying another
candidate being the test put forward by the SEC in Janus, which proposed that whoever is
responsible for "creating" a statement has also "made" it).
169. Id. at 142 (explaining that the Court's reading of "make" in Rule 1Ob-5(b) applies
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For example, Janus mentions how the advisory firm's participation in the
mutual fund's misleading securities filings went "undisclosed" in those doc-
uments.170 By contrast, Lorenzo's role as liaison and contact person for the
Waste2Energy debt offering was explicitly disclosed in the emails he sent.
171
Furthermore, the Janus opinion states that an inherent feature of any actor
who exercises "ultimate authority" over a false statement is that they also
serve a "necessary or inevitable" role in its dissemination to third parties.
172
Yet arguably, the false statements issued on behalf of Charles Vista would
not necessarily have reached a single client but-for the intervening fact that
Lorenzo personally decided to send them. Therefore, in the Court's dispo-
sition of Lorenzo, the scope of misstatement liability could be broadened at
the margins. Specifically, by interpreting the "ultimate authority" test in
Janus so that it covers a larger population of statement "makers" than may
have been envisioned by either of the D.C. Circuit opinions below.
The other possibility, of course, would be for the Court to uphold the
D.C. Circuit's determination that Lorenzo cannot be held liable for "mak-
ing" any false statement under Janus. This too would have relevance for
the reach of securities fraud enforcement under Rule 1Ob-5 by consolidat-
ing the holding of Janus, which was otherwise a contested and controversial
5-4 decision.173 In the process, the Court might also add further substance
to the "ultimate authority" test, with dicta that provides more guidance
about who wields that authority in the intra-firm context (where multiple
individuals may be considered plausible candidates for securities liability
due to their involvement in the making of a misstatement).174 This would
modestly expand the ambit of Janus, by expressly extending its logic to am-
to "person [s] or entit [ies]" with ultimate control over the content of a statement).
170. Id at 145; see also Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552
U.S. 148, 152-54 (2008) (focusing as well on the significance of a party being disclosed in
connection with a false statement).
171. See supra Section I.A. (describing the factual context for Lorenzo's emails).
172. Janus, 564 U.S. at 144 ("Without such [ultimate] authority, it is not 'necessary or
inevitable' that any falsehood will be contained in the statement.").
173. Id. at 158 (Breyer,J., dissenting) ("In sum, I can find nothing in § 10(b) or in Rule
lOb-5, its language, its history, or in precedent suggesting that Congress, in enacting the se-
curities laws, intended a loophole of the kind that the majority's rule may well create."); see
also Donald C. Langevoort, Lies Without Liars?Janus Capital and Conservative Securities Jurispru-
dence, 90 WASH. U. L. REv. 933, 934 (2013) (asserting that Janus has left both legal scholars
and practitioners with the task of analyzing how the Janus majority "so confidently came to
the conclusion that Rule lOb-5 means otherwise"); C. Steven Bradford, "Make" Means
'Make": Rdecting the Fourth Circuit's Two-Headed Interpretation fJanus Capital, 68 SMU L. REV.
645, 646, 648 (2012) (reviewing the lower courts' reception of the Janus decision and the
complications in applying its holding).
174. For instance, in affirming the D.C. Circuit, the Court could further explain that-
while Lorenzo held a nominally authoritative title (as Vice President of Investment Bank-
ing) mid-level personnel should never be construed as "makers" of fraudulent statements
when acting in their capacities as subordinates to more senior decisionmakers at the firm.
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biguous circumstances which may not have otherwise been recognized in
the lower courts or the SEC's enforcement division.1
75
3. Scenario #3: Scheme Liability Versus Misstatement Liability
The most direct route to an impactful ruling on the scope of securities
fraud that Lorenzo presents the Court is to clarify the distinction, or lack
thereof, between Rule I Ob-5's provisions on scheme liability (subsections (a)
and (c)) and misstatements liability (under subsection (b)).176 While Judge
Kavanaugh's dissent parts ways with the majority opinion regarding Lo-
renzo's scienter, that is a dispute over either a question of fact or a legal is-
sue relating to administrative procedure. And on the application of the ul-
timate authority test set forth in Janus to the SEC's claim under subsection
(b), the majority and dissent are in full accord. But the relationship be-
tween scheme and misstatement liability is a foundational question of secu-
rities law, and one that drives much of the disagreement in the D.C. Circuit
panel's decision.
a. The Scope of Scheme Liability
One entry point on this issue is an assertion in judge Srinivasan's majori-
ty opinion, which suggests that there is either a complete or near-complete
consensus among the lower federal courts over the scope of scheme liabil-
ity. 17 7 More specifically, according to the D.C. Circuit, the consensus is
that scheme liability covers an expansive set of conduct that may include
actions which are also covered by the prohibition on misleading statements
in subsection (b).178 Judge Kavanaugh pushes back on both prongs of that
argument in his dissent. But the majority's framing of the relevant legal au-
thority is mainly problematic because it is unhelpful, even if correct. Alt-
hough the existence of at least partial overlap between scheme and mis-
statement liability is well-established,79 that observation does not resolve
the legal questions raised by the facts of Lorenzo. Instead, the dispositive is-
sue is whether the overlap among Rule lOb-5's provisions is nearly com-
plete or generally limited and incidental.
A review of the case law indicates that there is a genuine split among the
175. See GRACE A. CARTER ET AL., PAUL HASTINGS LLP, WHAT JANUS MEANT: THE
FIRST WAVE OF COURT DECISIONS INTERPRETING THE SUPREME COURT'S "ULTIMATE
AUTHORITY" TEST IN SECURITIES CASES, (Dec. 2011) (surveying how Janus has been re-
ceived in the lower courts); cf In reJamesJ. Pasztor, 54 S.E.C. 398, 406-07, 411-13 (1999)
(finding multiple individuals liable for the same underlying misstatement); In re Charles K.
Seavey, 56 S.E.C. 357, 364-65, 368 (2003), affd, 111 F. App'x 911 (9th Cir. 2004) (same).
176. See supra note 62 and accompanying text (quoting Rule lOb-5 in full).
177. See Lorenzo v. SEC, 872 F.3d 578, 591-92 (D.C. Cir. 2017).
178. Id.
179. SEC v. Nat'l Sec., Inc., 393 U.S. 453, 468 (1969) (explaining how there is "some
overlap" among the prohibitions set forth in the three subsections of Rule IOb-5).
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circuit courts on that question, which Lorenzo's Cert Petition labels as the
"majority" and "minority" view. 180 One court for the so-called majority
position is the Second Circuit. In its leading decision on point, Lentell v.
Merrill Lynch & Co.,181 the court states: "We hold that where the sole basis
for such [securities fraud] claims is alleged misrepresentations or omissions,
plaintiffs have not made out a market manipulation claim under Rule lOb-
5(a) and (c)."' 182 Similarly, the Ninth Circuit has held that, "[w]e must rec-
ognize, however, that manipulative conduct has always been distinct from
actionable [false statements or] omissions."18 3 Precedent from the Eighth
Circuit accords with the Second and Ninth Circuit's line of thinking as
well. 1
8 4
What the Cert Petition terms the minority view is in fact best understood
as originating from the SEC itself, rather than any federal court. In partic-
ular, with the Commission's 2014 decision in In re Flannery,185 the SEC took
the position that scheme liability under subsections (a) and (c) "would pro-
scribe even a single act of making or drafting a material misstatement o in-
vestors."186 Flanney, which the First Circuit overturned on other grounds,
thereby sought to establish the principle that overlap between scheme and
misstatement liability does not merely exist sometimes; rather, such overlap is
more or less comprehensive. In other words, conduct that triggers mis-
statement liability should be considered a genre or subset of the broader
range of behavior that falls under the other provisions of Rule 1Ob-5.
At least one federal court of appeals, the Eleventh Circuit, appears to
have taken the SEC's lead with holdings that roughly track the interpreta-
tion of Rule lOb-5 in Flannery.187 In Lorenzo, Judge Srinivasan's opinion
180. See Lorenzo, 872 F.3d at 600 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (arguing that there is a cir-
cuit split); Cert. Pet., supra note 130, at 17-21 (summarizing these dueling positions).
181. 396 F.3d 161 (2d Cir. 2005).
182. Id at 177 (citing Schnell v. Conseco, Inc., 43 F. Supp. 2d 438, 447-48 (S.D.N.Y.
1999) (Parker, B.D.,J.) (reaching the same conclusion).
183. Desai v. Deutsche Bank Sec. Ltd., 573 F.3d 931, 939 (9th Cir. 2009); see also WPP
Luxembourg Gamma Three Sarl v. Spot Runner, Inc., 655 F.3d 1039, 1057 (9th Cir. 2011)
(holding that there is only "liab[ility] as part of a fraudulent scheme based upon misrepre-
sentations and omissions under Rules 1Ob-5(a) or (c) when the scheme also encompasses
conduct beyond those misrepresentations or omissions").
184. See Pub. Pension Fund Grp v. KV Pharm. Co, 679 F.3d 972, 987 (8th Cir. 2012)
("We join the Second and Ninth Circuits in recognizing a scheme liability claim must be
based on conduct beyond misrepresentations or omissions actionable under Rule lOb-
5(b).").
185. In re Flannery, Exchange Act Release No. 9689, 2014 WL 7145625 (Dec. 15,
2014), vacated on other grounds, Flannery v. SEC, 810 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2015).
186. See id. at *18. See generaUy Andrew N. Vollmer, SEC Revanchism and the Expansion of
Prima Liabili y Under Section 17(a) and Rule 1Ob-5, 10 VA. L. & Bus. REV. 273 (2016) (discuss-
ing Flannery).
187. See SEC v. Big Apple Consulting USA, Inc., 783 F.3d 786, 796 (observing that
"even a person... who is not the 'maker' of an untrue statement of material fact, nonethe-
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never expressly signs on to the SEC's position that misleading statements
are per se fraudulent schemes.188 But it joins with the Eleventh Circuit by
implicitly endorsing the same underlying logic. Because the culpable con-
duct that Lorenzo is alleged to have committed revolves almost entirely
around the sending of two e-mails-which is about as close to a paradigm
example of misleading statements as one can get-it is fair to say that the
D.C. Circuit in effect adopted the SEC theory from Flannery sub silentio. 1
8 9
b. Implications for Securities Fraud Doctrine
Unless the Court can find a creative way to review the D.C. Circuit's de-
cision without reaching the issue of misstatement versus scheme liability, its
ruling in Lorenzo will likely have to address some basic questions of securities
fraud doctrine. There are two legal paths in particular that would allow for
a potentially significant reversal of the D.C. Circuit's conclusion that Lo-
renzo is liable under Rule lOb-5.
The most direct route is to follow the reasoning in Judge Kavanaugh's
dissent, by making a sharp distinction among the subsections of Rule 1 Ob-5
which precludes the "repackaging" of misleading statements as fraudulent
schemes. That is, there must be substantial conduct above and beyond that
associated with the communication of a misleading statement-such as lit-
eral market manipulation, in the sense of covert pump-and-dump trading
tactics that are meant to temporarily inflate the price of a particular asset. 190
Such a holding might leave open the possibility of applying overlapping lia-
bility to some courses of conduct, but nonetheless draw a conceptual bright
line between the two theories of securities fraud for the kinds of misleading
communications at issue in Lorenzo. 1
9
1
less could be liable as a primary violator of Rule lOb-5(a) and (c)"); see also SEC v. Monteros-
so, 756 F.3d 1326, 1334 (1 1th Cir. 2014) (arguing that the "maker" of an untrue statement
of material fact could be liable as a primary violator of Rule 10b-5(a) and (c)).
188. Lorenzo v. SEC, 872 F.3d 578 (D.C. Cir. 2017).
189. Id. at 591-92 (stating that scheme liability "may encompass certain conduct in-
volving the dissemination of false statements" but declining to identify any hypothetical sce-
nario where it may not).
190. This definition is also consistent with the existing Supreme Court precedents on
point. See Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 464, 476 (1977) (holding that
"[m] anipulation" under 10b-5(a), (c) is 'virtually a term of art when used in connection with
securities markets.... The term refers generally to practices, such as wash sales, matched
orders, or rigged prices, that are intended to mislead investors by artificially affecting market
activity."') (citation omitted); see also Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 189, 199 (1976)
("[Manipulation] connotes intentional or willful conduct designed to deceive or defraud in-
vestors by controlling or artificially affecting the price of securities.").
191. One justification for maintaining separate conceptual categories of securities fraud
is that, without them, either the scheme or misstatements ubsections of Rule 1Ob-5 become
surplusage. See Desai v. Deutsche Bank Sec. Ltd., 573 F.3d 931, 941 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing
Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc-, 552 U.S. 148, 158-59 (2008);
[71:1
KA VANAUGH LORENZO V. SEC, AND THE SUPREME COURT
In the alternative, the Court could also reverse the D.C. Circuit with an
opinion that is in full agreement withJudge Srinivasan's determination that
Rule I Ob-5's scheme liability provisions are sufficiently broad to cover false
statements that defraud investors. The rationale there would be that the
ultimate authority test in Janus applies to any claim regarding misleading
representations, no matter which provisions of Rule lOb-5 are invoked.192
In that case, even if the emails to Charles Vista's clients constitute a fraudu-
lent scheme under subsections (a) and (c), the conclusion that Lorenzo
lacked the decisionmaking authority to be held directly liable for that
scheme remains the same.
c. Implications for Securities Fraud Enforcement
A holding that reverses the D.C. Circuit along either of the lines summa-
rized above would have substantial implications for the way that securities
fraud is enforced in practice. The same result under both theories would
be to narrow the scope of primary versus secondary securities fraud liability
for materially misleading statements.193 Instead of the SEC pursuing pri-
mary claims under Rule lOb-5 as the default legal basis for its enforcement
actions, that charge will be unavailable in many cases going forward; often,
the SEC's only viable cause of action for some defendants will be a claim
that they aided-and-abetted another party's direct violation of the securities
laws.194 In effect, the enforcement strategy that Lorenzo "recommends" to
the SEC in his Cert Petition would become its only choice, rather than one
of its two options. 1
95
Shifting the fault line between primary and secondary liability under
Rule 1Ob-5 would also have consequences for the private right of action
available in securities class actions and for other investor plaintiffs. First,
some background. Ever since the Court's decision in a 1994 case, Central
Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 196 private plaintiffs cannot bring
claims for aiding and abetting securities fraud.197 Only the SEC can do so,
Cent. Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 166, 177 (1994)) (making
this point in stating that "[w]e decline to read the Supreme Court's case law on manipula-
tive conduct as little more than an entertaining, but completely superfluous, intellectual ex-
ercise").
192. See Brief of Amici Curiae Securities Law Professors Supporting Petitioner at 4-8,
Lorenzo, 872 F.3d 578 (No. 17-1077), 2018 WL 4142633 (providing an argument along these
lines).
193. See generally Elizabeth Consenza, Is the Third Time the Chann?Janus and the Proper Bal-
ance Between Primay and Seconday Liability Under Section 10(B), 33 CARDOzO L. REv. 1019
(2012).
194. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2012) (codification of Section 20(e)).
195. See Cert. Pet., supra note 130, at 28.
196. 511 U.S. 166 (1994).
197. Id at 173.
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under § 20(e) of 1995 Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA). 198
This is where the real import of Janus lies.199 In a pre-Central Bank of Denver
world, the Janus plaintiffs could have invoked Rule 1Gb-5(b) to sue both the
mutual fund entity (primarily, for making false statements) and its advisory
firm (for aiding and abetting the mutual fund's misstatements), but that
door closed as of 1994. Post-Central Bank of Denver, and after the passages of
the PSLRA, the SEC alone would have a cause of action against the advi-
sory firm in Janus.
The doctrinal thread that runs through Central Bank of Denver, Janus, and
Lorenzo is classic securities law arcana, but ultimately it boils down to who
can sue whom and for what. The takeaway is this: at least as of now, for
private securities plaintiffs in the Eighth and D.C. Circuits, actions against
advisory entities that assist another firm in the "making" of a statement un-
der Janus might remain live so long as they are pled as scheme liability
claims under subsections (a) and (c). If the Court follows Judge Ka-
vanaugh's dissent in Lorenzo, however, the ability of private securities plain-
tiffs to rely on scheme liability as an alternative to secondary misstatement
claims will be definitively foreclosed in every federal court.
200
This may not sound like the most groundbreaking development, but its
impact should not be underestimated. For one, uniformity across the cir-
cuit courts of appeals is important because forum shopping is relatively easy
and common in securities litigation. And more fundamentally, because a
central policy mechanism in securities regulation is its dual public-private
enforcement regime, subtle changes in the allocation of public and private
enforcement authority can potentially affect how the entire framework op-
erates.20 ' As a result, the legal theory suggested by Judge Kavanaugh's dis-
sent in Lorenzo presents the Court with an opportunity to redraw some of
the basic doctrinal contours of securities fraud.
C. The Supreme Court's Eight-Justice Decision in Lorenzo
Predicting what the Court might decide is always risky, even after oral
argument has been held, and the Justices' questioning at oral argument in
Lorenzo was particularly open-ended and wide-ranging.2 0 2 With the usual
caveats aside, it is still worth speculating how Lorenzo is likely to be resolved
198. 15 U.S.C. § 78t(e).
199. See Consenza, supra note 193.
200. Thus, if the Lorenzo scenario were replayed after such a decision, the SEC could
sue the Charles Vista entity and/or Gregg Lorenzo under Rule 1Ob-5, and Lorenzo under
Section 20(e). Charles Vista's clients would have no claim against Lorenzo but could main-
tain a private cause of action for securities fraud against Gregg Lorenzo and Charles Vista.
201. See generally Amanda M. Rose, 77e Multienforcer Approach to Securities Fraud Deterrence:
A CriticalAnalysis, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 2173 (2010).
202. See generally Transcript of Oral Argument, Lorenzo v. SEC, No. 17-1077 (argued
Dec. 3, 2018).
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when a ruling comes down in 2019.
Perhaps the most plausible outcome is a 4-4 stalemate, split along the
same partisan lines that were staked out in Janus. On one side of that split,
the four Justices on the Court's liberal wing are likely to issue an opinion
that would affirm the D.C. Circuit's decision in part, to the extent that it
upholds the SEC fraud claims against Lorenzo.2 0 3 On the other side, the
four conservative Justices are likely to join an opinion that would: (a) re-
verse the D.C. Circuit in part, to the extent it finds Lorenzo liable on any of
the SEC's fraud claims; and (b) endorse some or all of the reasoning articu-
lated in judge Kavanaugh's dissent when doing so.
20 4
In the event the Court's review of Lorenzo ends in a tied vote, the legal re-
sult is for the D.C. Circuit ruling to stand untouched as the final merits de-
cision in the case.205 But there is good reason to believe its status as a con-
trolling legal authority is only temporary. With Justice Kavanaugh
available to cast the decisive swing vote in the next securities case that is
granted cert, the 4-4 draw in Lorenzo will encourage a wave of appeals that
may allow the Court to revisit the same issues within the next few years.
IV. THE SUPREME COURT'S SECURITIES LAWJURISPRUDENCE AFTER
LOREANZO
The doctrinal uncertainty that Justice Kavanaugh's confirmation implies
is not limited to the legal controversy raised in Lorenzo and applies more
broadly to the Court's securities law jurisprudence as a whole. With Lo-
renzo, the Court is potentially approaching a telling fork in the road. On
one hand, there are the restrained, incremental opinions that have held
sway over the past fourteen years on the Roberts Court. A narrow opinion
in keeping with "business as usual" would signal some inclination on the
part of the conservative Justices to stay the course for the indefinite future.
On the other hand, a broader opinion, even one that does not carry the day
due to a split vote, would indicate a willingness to follow the more activist
direction laid out in Judge Kavanaugh's dissent. Under that latter scenario,
Lorenzo could be seen as foreshadowing a return to the style of judging that
typified the "counter-revolutionary era" of securities law, which took place
duringJustice Powell's tenure on the Court from 1972 to 1988. This sec-
203. It is also possible that the liberal Justices would rule for a reversal in part, with re-
spect to portions ofJudge Srinivasan's majority opinion that reject the SEC's Rule lOb-5(b)
claim by applying Janus.
204. At oral argument, Justice Alito appeared to be the conservative Justice least in-
clined to follow this course. See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 202, at 12-13. The
Justice whose comments were most directly in line with the Kavanaugh dissent's reasoning
was Neil Gorsuch. See id. at 33-36.
205. For the only previous 4-4 Supreme Court split in i securities law case, see Carpen-
ter v. United States, 484 U.S. 20 (1987); see also United States v. Texas, 136 S. Ct. 2271
(2016) (introducing another more recent 4-4 split, leaving a lower court decision in the Fifth
Circuit intact).
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tion proceeds in two parts and walks through each of those paths forward.
A. More of the Same? Maintaining the Roberts Court's Enthusiastic Minimalism
Since John Roberts became ChiefJustice in 2005, the Court has issued
roughly twenty-five decisions related to securities law. As a result, a sizea-
ble academic commentary has developed, which attempts to characterize
the defining aspects of that body of opinions.20 6 That scholarship reflects a
general consensus over three main trends which have emerged during the
Roberts Court era and come to define its securities law jurisprudence.
1. The Roberts Court Status Quo
The first trademark of the Roberts Court is the volume of securities cases
that it hears. Even with the Court's docket shrinking as a whole, the annual
number of securities cases that have been granted cert since John Roberts's
tenure began has risen in both absolute and relative terms.207 Second, in
deciding those cases, there has been a greater agreement among the Justic-
es.2 08 9-0 securities law decisions at the Roberts Court are commonplace,
which was not necessarily true of previous eras at the Court. Third, and
most significant here, the actual securities opinions issued by the Roberts
Court have been modest in terms of their doctrinal impact.
As Professor Eric Chaffee writes, the Court has acted as a "museum cu-
rator"209 for existing precedents:
The vast majority of the cases that the Roberts Court has heard represent minor
tinkering with key issues of securities regulation, procedural issues that might more
easily be taught as part of a course in civil procedure, and issues on the outer limits of
securities regulation. The bulk of the cases would at best be included within notes in
securities law textbooks and treatises, rather than receiving lengthy, in-depth
treatment.
2 10
Thus, if the Roberts Court has distinguished itself in the securities area,
it would be with its curious combination of enthusiastic case selection and
constrained, minimalist holdings.
206. See, e.g., Eric C. Chaffee, The Supreme Court as Museum Curator: Securities Regulation and
the Roberts Court, 67 CASE WESTERN L. REv. 847 (2017); John C. Coates IV, Securities Litigation
in the Roberts Court: An Early Assessment, 57 ARIZ. L. REv. 1 (2015); Eric Alan Isaacson, The Rob-
erts Court and Securities Class Actions: Reaffirming Basic Principles, 48 AKRON L. REv. 923 (2015);
A.C. Pritchard, Securities Law in the Roberts Court. Agenda or Indifference?, 37 J. CORP. L. 105
(2011); Turk & Woody, supra note 19, at 90.
207. See Pritchard, supra note 206, at 107 (estimating that the Roberts Court has grant-
ed certiorari on approximately two securities law cases per term); cf RyanJ. Owens & David
A. Simon, Explaining the Supreme Court's Shrinking Docket, 53 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1219 (2012).
208. See Coates, supra note 206, at 22 tbl.5 (cataloguing the Court's voting patterns in
securities cases).
209. Chaffee, supra note 206, at 854.
210. Id. at854-55.
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A brief tour of securities regulation decisions at the Roberts Court is suf-
ficient to illustrate the point. Consider, for example, the opinion in Sal-
man v. United States;211 a 2016 decision that was anticipated by many to bring
about a major reformulation of insider trading law.2 12 Salman involved an
insider providing stock tips to his brother's brother-in-law under an ambig-
uous set of circumstances that put in question the pivotal "personal benefit"
test-a test that has raised thorny issues for the law of insider trading ever
since it was announced by the Court in a seminal opinion of 1983, Dirks v.
SEC.213 The end result, however, was an underwhelming opinion that
merely restated the longstanding test from Dirks in a way that neither ilu-
minated how the personal benefit test ought to be applied, nor otherwise
moved the needle on existing insider trading doctrine.2 14
Along with Salman, a number of other recent entries in the Roberts
Court securities law docket can be found, which involve perfunctory unan-
imous decisions that make marginal the prior doctrinal landscape. For in-
stance, in the 2010 decision Jones v. Harris Associates,215 the Court handed
down a ruling with the reasonable yet unremarkable holding that invest-
ment advisors may violate their fiduciary duties when they charge clients
disproportionately large fees.2 16 Likewise in a 2011 decision, Matrixx Initia-
tives v. Siracusano,217 the Court held that, under certain circumstances, in-
formation omitted from corporate disclosures be considered material to in-
vestors as a legal matter, even if the underlying data in question falls short
of textbook definitions of statistical significance in other respects.218 Further
211. 137 S. Ct. 420 (2016).
212. See, e.g., All Eyes on Salman: The Supreme Court's Newest Blockbuster Insider Trading Case,
DEBEVOISE & PLIMPTON: INSIDER TRADING & DISCLOSURE UPDATE, Aug. 2016, at 17,
https://www.debevoise.com/-/media/files/insights/publications/2016/08/insidertradin
g-updatevol3issue l.pdf.
213. 463 U.S. 648, 663-64 (1983).
214. See Jonathan R. Macey, The Genius of the Personal Benefit Test, 69 STAN. L. REv.
ONLINE 64, 72 (2016) ("Salmanj breaks no new ground and presents no issues that are either
novel or complex."); see also id. at 67, 71.
215. 559 U.S. 335 (2010).
216. Id. at 354; see Supreme Court Decides Jones v. Harris Associates and Establishes Standard
for Mutual Fund Excessive Fee Claims, ROPES & GRAY LLP (Mar. 26, 2010),
https:/ /www.ropesgray.com/en/newsroom/alerts/20 1 /03/supreme-court-decides-jones-
v-harris-associates-and-establishes-standard-for-mutua-fund-excessive-fee-claims ("[I]t is
expected that the decision will not fundamentally change the process by which boards of
mutual funds review and approve adviser fees.... The Court acknowledged in today's
opinion that the standard it adopted has been the 'consensus' view of courts for over 25
years.").
217. 563 U.S. 27 (2011).
218. Id. at 30-31; see Ronald Mann, Opinion Analysis: Chalk One Up for the Ninth Circui
SCOTUSBLOG (Mar. 24, 2011), http://www.scotusblog.com/2011/03/opinion-analysis-
chalk-one-up-for-the-ninth-circuit/ ("T]he opinion in [Matrixx] is more likely to stand for its
generous review of allegations in complaints than it is to make any important contribution to
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examples along these lines are easy to find.
2 19
Indeed, a handful of Roberts Court securities cases have failed to yield a
decision altogether, having been withdrawn from the Court's docket be-
cause either the Court or the parties determined the issues were not worth
litigating to a final determination on the merits. For example, the Court
removed a 2014 case, Public Employees' Retirement System v. IndyMac MBS,
Inc.,220 from its calendar just a week prior to its scheduled argument, with
an order which held that the petition for certiorari had been improvidently
granted. In a 2013 case before the Court, UBS Financial Services, Inc. v. Union
de Empleados de Muelles,22 1 it was the parties themselves who pulled the plug,
by settling two months after certiorari was granted. And in the Court's pri-
or October 2017 term another securities case, Leidos, Inc. v. Indiana Public Re-
tirement System,222 failed to yield a decision, as the parties settled before oral
argument was held.
223
2. How the Court's Ruling in Lorenzo Would Fit
It is entirely possible that, when Lorenzo is decided in 2019, it will repre-
sent the latest entry in the Roberts Court's crowded yet lackluster securities
law docket. After all, from the most literal perspective, the case turns on a
collection of curious trivialities: an afternoon's worth of blatantly unscrupu-
lous behavior, a $15,000 lost investment, and a head-scratching set of ques-
tions about who is most to blame. Despite the vehement tone throughout
much ofJudge Kavanaugh's dissent, even he concludes on an agnostic note
about what exactly took place, conceding that "maybe Lorenzo really is
guilty of negligence (or worse)."224 And as detailed in Section III above,
the substance of securities law."); Decision in Matrixx Initiatives v. Siracusano Rejects Bright-
Line Rule in Securities Fraud Action Based on Pharmaceutical Company's Failure to Disclose Adverse Event
DAVISPoLK: CLIENT NEWSFLASH (Mar. 22, 2011), https://www.davispolk.com/publica
tions /decision-matrixx-initiatives-inc-v-siracusano-rejects-bright-line-rule-securities-fraud
(stating that the Court's decision "does not change the status quo regarding the standard for
evaluating materiality and does not provide more definitive guidance to companies con-
cerned with when and what to disclose").
219. See, e.g., Merrill Lynch v. Manning, 578 U.S. 1566 (2016) (unanimous opinion)
(upholding federal question jurisdiction for claims that require a court to confront interpre-
tative issues relating to the federal securities statutes); Gabelli v. SEC, 568 U.S. 442, 454
(2013) (unanimous opinion) (declining to extend the "discovery rule" exception in private
securities fraud actions to the statute of limitations period that applies in government en-
forcement actions).
220. 135 S. Ct. 42 (2014) (mem.).
221. 134 S. Ct. 40 (2013) (mem.).
222. 137 S. Ct. 1395-96 (2017) (mem.) (cert granted).
223. For an overview of the events leading to the Leidos settlement, see generally Mat-
thew C. Turk & Karen E. Woody, The Leidos Mixup and the Misunderstood Duty to Disclose in
Securities Law, 75 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 957 (2018); Turk & Woody, supra note 19.
224. Lorenzo v. SEC, 872 F.3d 578, 602 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (Kavanaugh,J., dissenting).
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there are a number of legal resolutions that would allow the Court to duck
the fundamental doctrinal questions regarding the scope of scheme liability.
Part of this Article's thesis of Lorenzo as bellwether, however, is that an
anticlimactic ending to the case would nonetheless have big picture impli-
cations. Namely, it would suggest a reluctance by the other eightJustices to
join with bolder theories thatJustice Kavanaugh may be inclined to pursue
in future securities cases. And more broadly, a narrow opinion would fur-
ther indicate that the Roberts Court's status as "museum curator" of the
Supreme Court's existing securities law jurisprudence is likely to persist for
the foreseeable future.225
B. Or, Back to the Future? A Return to Judicial Activism
The Roberts Court's incrementalism stands out because the Court's se-
curities law decisions in prior eras were anything but light touch. Specifi-
cally, the Supreme Court's jurisprudence has been defined by two periods
of activism since the modern regulatory framework was established with the
1933 Securities Act and 1934 Securities Exchange Act.
The first period, which began in 1940 with one of the Supreme Court's
very first securities-related decisions, was characterized by an aggressive ju-
dicial expansion of securities law,2 26 The heyday of this expansionist era
took place during the tenure of Chief Justice Earl Warren, from 1953 to
1969, a period in which it was commonplace for the Court's holdings to
emphasize the "broad remedial purposes"227 of federal securities statutes
and the related need to interpret their provisions "not technically ... but
flexibly." 228 That theme, in fact, appeared in nearly all of the Warren
Court's decisions. According to an empirical study of the Supreme Court
securities docket from 1936-1971 by Professors Thomas Sullivan and
Richard Thompson, the Justices voted in favor of expansive (rather than
restrictive) interpretations of the securities laws in twenty-one of twenty-four
cases.229 As a classic securities regulation casebook memorably put it, this
was a time when the Court saw "securities law as savior of all humanity."230
225. See generally Chaffee, supra note 206.
226. See generally SEC v. U.S. Realty & Improvement Co., 310 U.S. 434 (1940). Tech-
nically, the first ever Supreme Court securities decision came in 1936 with Jones v. SEC, 298
U.S. 1 (1936). The holding in Jones is a lone outlier with respect to the Court's post-1940
cases, as it was decided by a majority of anti-New Deal holdouts who were replaced by Roo-
sevelt soon after. See E. Thomas Sullivan & Robert B. Thompson, The Supreme Court and Pi-
vate Law: The Vanishing Importance for Securities and Antitrust, 53 EMORY LJ. 1571, 1585 n.58
(2004) (making this observation).
227. J.I. Case v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 431 (1964).
228. SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, 375 U.S. 180, 195 (1963).
229. Sullivan & Thompson, supra note 226, at 1580-81.
230. DAVID RATNER, SECURITIEs REGULATION (2d ed. 1980).
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1. The "Counter-Revolution" Under justice Powell
The expansionist revolution of the federal securities laws came to an end
when Justice William Rehnquist and Justice Lewis Powell both joined the
Court in January of 1972.231 This marked the beginning of a so-called
"counter-revolution" in Supreme Court securities jurisprudence,232 in
which the Court consistently took a skeptical view of its prior case law.
That skepticism was epitomized injustice Rehnquist's majority opinion in
an important 1975 decision, Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores,
233 when he
famously described the state of securities fraud doctrine under Rule lOb-5
as "a judicial oak which has grown from little more than a legislative
acorn."
234
However, it was Justice Powell, rather than Justice Rehnquist, who truly
drove the counter-revolution by leveraging his corporate law background to
advocate a more constrained brand of securities law doctrine to his other
colleagues on the Court.2 35 As documented in the Sullivan & Thompson
study, those efforts were highly successful.2 3
6 The Court came to relatively
restrictive legal conclusions about the scope of securities regulation in twen-
ty-four of the twenty-five cases decided during Justice Powell's tenure from
1972 to 1987.237 Many of the landmark opinions from that body of law-
such as the foundational insider trading cases, Chiarella v. United States
238 and
the aforementioned Dirks--were penned by Justice Powell himself
2 39 Per-
haps even more remarkable was the way in which other members of the
Court followed Justice Powell's lead. Nearly every Justice during the coun-
ter-revolutionary era authored a far-reaching securities law opinion on be-
half of the Court's majority.240 This, despite the fact that most of thoseJus-
231. See Sullivan & Thompson, supra note 226, at 1581-82.
232. A.C. Pritchard, justice Lewis F Powell, Jr., and the Counterrevolution in the Federal Securi-
ties Law, 52 DUKE LJ. 841 (2003); cf VINCENT BLASI, THE BURGER COURT, THE COUNTER-
REVOLUTION THAT WASN'T (1987) (arguing that the Burger Court's story was not as con-
servative counter-revolutionary as some suggest).
233. 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
234. Id. at 737.
235. See generally Pritchard, supra note 232.
236. See Sullivan & Thompson, supra note 226.
237. Id. at 1581-82.
238. 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
239. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983); see also Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S.
185 (1976) (Powell, J.); United Hous. Found. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837 (1975) (Powell, J.);
Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551 (1979) (Powell, J.). See generally Adam C.
Pritchard, Dirks and the Genesis of Personal Benefit, 68 SMU L. REV. 857 (2015).
240. See e.g., TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438 (1976) (Marshall, J.);
Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977) (White,J.); Coopers & Lybrand v. Live-
say, 437 U.S. 463 (1978) (StevensJ.); Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560 (1979)
(Rehnquist, J.); Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471 (1979) (Brennan, J.); Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S.
680 (1980) (StewartJ.).
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tices did not write any notable securities opinions (whether restrictive or ex-
pansionist) either before or after they shared the bench with Justice Pow-
ell. 241 The counter-revolutionary posture of the Court was therefore no-
where to be found in the years from 1988 to 2004, when William
Rehnquist was ChiefJustice, as the Court essentially lost interest in securi-
ties regulation, shrinking its caseload substantially and alternating at ran-
dom between expansionist and restrictive decisions.2 42
The one exception came in 1994, with the Court's decision in Central
Bank of Denver,243 which can be considered the last gasp of the counter-
revolution. In an opinion by Justice Kennedy-who was not otherwise a
major figure in restrictive securities decisions2" the Court once again
pruned back the judicial oak of securities fraud doctrine by holding that
there was no right of action for aiding-and-abetting claims under Rule l Ob-
5.245 While the impact of that holding was itself highly consequential on the
merits, even more notable was the legal backdrop in which it arrived. Ra-
ther than intervening in a circuit split, the Court's decision instead over-
turned what had been a unanimous, multi-decade consensus across all
twelve federal courts of appeals as to the availability of aiding-and-abetting
claims for private securities plaintiffs.246 In doing so, Central Bank of Denver
typified the counter-revolutionary era jurisprudence, in which the Court
actively imposed a textualist, limited theory of the securities laws and did
not hesitate to overrule any long-standing doctrinal understanding to the
contrary.2 4
7
2. How the Court's Ruling in Lorenzo Would Fit
Judge Kavanaugh's dissent in Lorenzo spends a good deal of time framing
the case in terms of the broader history of securities law jurisprudence at
the Court. His argument, that the majority should have articulated a lim-
ited scope for the scheme liability provisions in Rule 1Ob-5, is in part moti-
vated by what he describes as a decades-long campaign by the SEC to "ex-
pand the scope of primary liability under the securities laws"248 through its
241. Sullivan & Thompson, supra note 226, at 1592-97.
242. Id. at 1582-84.
243. 511 U.S. 164 (1994).
244. Sullivan & Thompson, supra note 226, at 1596.
245. Central Bank ofDenver, 511 U.S. at 173; see infra Section IH.B.3.c. (discussing the sig-
nificance of Central Bank ofDenver); see also Paul Dmitri Zier, Central Bank of Denver v. First
Interstate Bank: Pruning the Judicial Oak by Severing the Aiding and Abetting Branch, 72 DENVER U.
L. REV. 191 (1994) (examining the build up to and the decision in Central Bank of Denver).
246. See id. at 196; see also Donald C. Langevoort, Words from on Hgh About Rule lOb-5:
Chiarella's Histoy, Central Bank's Future, 20 DEL.J. CoRP. L. 865 (1995).
247. See Zier, supra note 245, at 192 ("Prior to Central Bank, many commentators felt the
doctrine had become so established that the Supreme Court would never reject it.").
248. Lorenzo v. SEC, 872 F.3d. 578, 601 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (Kavanaugh,J., dissenting).
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C4persistent efforts to end-run the Supreme Court"249 precedents. The dis-
sent's narrative on this point is underscored by its reference to a recent arti-
cle by Professor Andrew Vollmer, which analyzes the SEC's litigation posi-
tions in Flannery and a related line of cases which lead up to Lorenzo.
250
Professor Vollmer argues that those positions represent a strategy of "re-
vanchism," through which the SEC has sought to regain the doctrinal
ground that was lost in cases from the counter-revolutionary era, such as
Central Bank of Denver, by developing creative legal theories in its internal ad-
judications or otherwise adopting similar positions as a litigation strategy in
the federal district courts.
2 51
If the Court decides Lorenzo by reversing the D.C. Circuit with an opin-
ion that sharply circumscribes bounds of primary liability for securities
fraud, it will be hard pressed to do so without also signing on to the broader
narrative which animates Judge Kavanaugh's disagreement with the major-
ity opinion. It will also be heeding the dissent's call to forcefully push back
against the SEC's revanchist strategy as it percolates through the lower
courts.252 Looking back from 2019, it is possible that such a decision would
be seen as a turning point for the Roberts Court in which it abandons the
role of museum curator and adopts a more aggressive mode of deci-
sionmaking that is reminiscent of the Court's counter-revolutionary opin-
ions underJustice Powell.
V. THE REGULATORY & ADMINISTRATIVE STATE AFTER LOREvZO
After narrating the procedural history of Lorenzo in three dramatic acts,
Judge Kavanaugh's dissent concludes with a final section which presents
the denouement. In those closing paragraphs, he turns to the implications
the case carries for some fundamental questions about the relationship be-
tween the modern regulatory state, the federal courts, and the separation of
powers principles which structure the U.S. Constitution. Specifically, Judge
Kavanaugh writes that the standards ofjudicial review which are enshrined
249. Id.
250. Vollmer, supra note 186.
251. Id.; see also A.C. Pritchard, The SEC, Administrative Usurpation, and Insider Trading, 69
STAN, L. REv. ONLINE 55 (2016) (discussing the various legal theories the Court applied in
securities cases after the counter-revolutionary era).
252. The SEC's briefing to the Court on Lorenzo's Cert Petition gets close to inviting
this outcome itself by repeatedly relying on dicta from expansionist era cases at the Warren
Court which embraced a broadly purposive philosophy of statutory interpretation, which
was roundly rejected by the counter-revolutionary Court. See SEC Cert. Opp. supra note
130, at 10, 12 (citing SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180 (1963)); see
also id at 9, 11 (citing Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972)).
It also provided further fodder for Professor Vollmer's "revanchist" narrative in its briefing
to the D.C. Circuit, by relying on its own adjudicative decision in Fannoey as the relevant
legal interpretation of Rule lOb-5 that it proposes in that case. See Lorenzo, 872 F.3d at 599
(Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
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in administrative law doctrine have produced an "agency-centric process
[which] is in some tension with Article III of the Constitution, the Due Pro-
cess Clause of the Fifth Amendment, and the Seventh Amendment right to
a jury trial in civil cases."253 The dissent continues:
That tension is exacerbated when, as here, the agency's political appointees-without
hearing from any witnesses-disregard an administrative law judge's factual findings.
That said, the Supreme Court has allowed administrative adjudication ever since
Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 [additional reporters omitted] (1932). But the premise
of Crowell v. Benson is that, putting aside any formal constitutional problems with the
notion of administrative adjudication, the administrative adjudication process will at
least operate with efficiency and with fairness to the parties involved. This case,
among others, casts substantial doubt on that premise.254
As these passages make clear, Judge Kavanaugh's underlying critique in
Lorenzo is not really about the SEC per se, but instead applies with equal
force across the administrative state. Indeed, Judge Kavanaugh highlights
the Lorenzo dissent's continuity with his overarching perspective on adminis-
trative law, by citing to a number of other opinions in which he has written
separately to address the overall legitimacy of agency decisionmaking.255
Because Judge Kavanaugh's views on regulatory matters are arguably his
singular contribution as a jurist, the Lorenzo dissent goes a long way toward
defining his judicial philosophy as a whole, and further clarifies the impact
he will have upon joining the post-Kennedy Supreme Court.
A. Judge Kavanaugh's Theory ofAdministrative Law
The best way to understand what is unique about Judge Kavanaugh's
theory of administrative law is to compare his dissent in Lorenzo with Judge
Srinivasan's majority opinion for the court. In many respects, the D.C.
Circuit's decision reflects the prevailing view of the administrative state
whichJudge Kavanaugh rejects. That conventional wisdom is defined by a
few working assumptions.256
First, it takes for granted that there is no inherent problem with the
253. Lorenzo, 872 F.3d at 602.
254. Idt
255. Id. at 598 (citing United States v. Burwell, 690 F.3d 500, 527 (D.C. Cir. 2012)
(Kavanaugh, J., dissenting); Bluman v. FEC, 800 F. Supp. 2d 281 (D.D.C. 2011) (Ka-
vanaugh, J.); United States v. Moore, 612 F.3d 698, 702-04 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (Kavanaugh,
J., concurring)).
256. The conventional wisdom, at least, for the D.C. Circuit, the Supreme Court's
post-New Deal jurisprudence, and most administrative law scholars. But cf. Abbe R. Gluck
& Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation on the Bench.'A Survy of Forty-Two Judges on the Feder-
al Courts of Appeals, 131 HARV. L. REv. 1298, 1312-13, 1320 (2018) (reporting its conclusion
from a survey of federal judges that the "D.C. Circuit is different"-one of the findings of
the study is that the D.C. Circuit, which "acts essentially as a specialized court when it
comes to administrative law" and handles the bulk of Chevron cases, has "drunk the Chevron
Kool-Aid").
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combination of governmental functions-legislative, executive, and judi-
cial-that takes place at administrative agencies.257 The Lorenzo majority
has no qualms about the fact that the SEC promulgated Rule lOb-5, ap-
plied it in an enforcement action against Lorenzo, and then adjudicated
those claims in its own court. Second, the prevailing view presumes that
the default posture of federal courts when reviewing agency decisionmaking
will be some form of deference.258 From that perspective, Judge Sriniva-
san's repeated disclaimers about the court's "very deferential" standard of
review are not only a technically accurate statement of the law based on the
particular posture of that case; they are also affirming the D.C. Circuit's
general orientation with respect to regulatory bodies such as the SEC.25
9
A final premise of the standard administrative law paradigm is that the
pervasive reliance on judicial deference is justified on two related grounds.
One is that, when the federal courts reverse an agency action, they are indi-
rectly encroaching on the discretion of other branches of the government.
That is because the agency has not acted on its own behalf; rather, it is im-
plementing a policy decision that has already been made by either Con-
gress or the President, which then enlisted the agency to complete the
task.260 The other justification for judicial deference follows from the first
but is more pragmatic. The reason why Congress or the President delegate
policymaking discretion to an agency in the first place, the argument goes,
must be that it has the technical expertise or access to information neces-
sary to exercise that authority most effectively.261 The regulator enjoys a
comparative advantage in terms of institutional competence. Thus, if
courts are able to easily substitute their less informed judgments for those of
257. See generally M. Elizabeth Magill, Beyond Powers and Branches in Separation of Powers
Law, 150 U. PA. L. REv. 603 (2001) (arguing that traditional separation of powers concerns
are misplaced in the context of administrative agencies).
258. See generally ADRIAN VERMEULE, LAW'S ABNEGATION: FROM LAw's EMPIRE TO
THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE (2016) (chronicling the shift toward judicial deference with re-
spect to agency decisionmaking since the New Deal).
259. Lorenzo, 872 F.3d. at 583, 593.
260. According to the non-delegation doctrine, Congress delegates its Article I legisla-
tive authority to agencies. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 ("All legislative Powers herein granted
shall be vested in a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and a
House of Representatives."); see Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'n, 531 U.S. 457, 488-90
(2001) (Stevens, J., concurring); see also Kathryn Watts, Rulemaking as Legislating, 103 GEO. LJ.
1003 (2013). Under another view, the President is delegating the authority vested in Article
II in furtherance of its constitutional responsibility to "take care that the laws be faithfully
executed." U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1. See generally Jack Goldsmith & John F. Manning, The
President's Completion Power, 115 YALE LJ. 2280 (2006) (noting that the presidential comple-
tion power is the justification for a broad range of presidential prerogatives); see also Eric
Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Interring the Nondelegation Doctrine, 69 U. CHI. L. REv. 1721 (2002).
261. See generally JAMES M. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS (1938) (articulating
the seminal case for why agencies have an institutional advantage in many policymaking
contexts).
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the agencies, there will tend to be bad results.
1. The Separation of Powers Constraint
The Lorenzo dissent shows how Judge Kavanaugh systematically departs
from the standard theory of administrative law by questioning all of the
core assumptions listed above. Particularly revealing is the dissent's ap-
proving reference to Professor Philip Hamburger's recent book, Is Adminis-
trative Law Unlawfu?.262 Professor Hamburger's answer to the question
posed in his title is an unequivocal "yes." He explains why over the course
of six-hundred pages, which argue that the modern administrative state is
fundamentally incompatible with Anglo-American rule of law tradition.
263
The Lorenzo dissent is therefore invoking a wholesale constitutional critique.
Its grudging "that said" citation to Crowell v. Benson is revealing as well.
264
The specific holding in Crowell ruled that a maritime agency's adjudication
of workers' compensation claims did not violate those workers' Fifth
Amendment due process.2 65 But the case has since taken on a larger signif-
icance and come to stand as the historical marker for when the Supreme
Court accepted the basic constitutional legitimacy of the administrative
state and never looked back.
2 66
A recurring theme in Professor Hamburger's book is that the underlying
problem with the administrative state is that it is in conflict with separation
of powers principles.267 To a large extent, that is Judge Kavanaugh's mas-
ter theme as well. In his Joseph Story Lecture, delivered at the Heritage Foun-
dation in 2017, Judge Kavanaugh stated: "Every case is a separation of
powers case... . 'Who decides?' is the basic separation of powers ques-
tion.... " 268 In Judge Kavanaugh's view, the separation of powers is not a
loose metaphor from high school civics and has real substantive content. A
careful reading of the constitutional text-which he refers to in the Story
Lecture as a "document of majestic specificity"269-shows that it sets forth
detailed, discernable boundaries for the three branches of government.
262. Lorenzo, 872 F.3d at 602 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (citing PHILIP HAMBURGER, IS
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW UNLAWFuL? 227-57 (2014)).
263. See HAMBURGER, supra note 262, at 227-57 (2014). For other prominent argu-
ments similar to those set forth in Philip Hamburger's book, see Richard A. Epstein, Why the
Modem Administrative State is Inconsistent with the Rue of Law, 3 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 491
(2008); Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107 HARv. L. REV. 1231
(1994); andJeremy Waldron, Separation of Powers in Thought and Practice?, 54 B.C. L. REV. 433
(2013).
264. Lorenzo, 872 F.3d. at 602.
265. 285 U.S. 22, 41 (1932).
266. VERMEULE, supra note 258, at 23-34.
267. See HAMBURGER, supra note 262, at 222, 334.
268. Kavanaugh, Maintaining the Separation of Powers, supra note 7, at 4 (internal quota-
tions omitted).
269. Id. at 3.
2019]
ADMINISTRATIVE LA W REVIEW
Judge Kavanaugh's critique of the administrative state is that it often upsets
those constitutionally-mandated boundaries.
The most direct way that can happen is for agencies to occupy a fourth
branch of the government unto themselves. This is potentially the case for
so-called "independent agencies," which are established by statutes that
build-in some degree of autonomy from the Executive Branch, primarily
with "good cause" removal provisions that limit the President's authority to
replace top agency personnel at-will.270 Judge Kavanaugh has written mul-
tiple opinions for the D.C. Circuit concluding that agency independence
creates a constitutional problem.
Perhaps the most important of those is his dissent from a 2008 decision
Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Co. Accounting Oversight Board.271 The dissent in
Free Enterprise Fund addresses separation of powers issues throughout.2 72 In
fact, it spends nearly thirty pages in support of the proposition that an in-
dependent agency established under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002-the
Public Company Accounting Oversight Board-placed barriers on the re-
moval process, which violated the President's executive authority under Ar-
ticle II. The same line of argument reappears in another notable Judge
Kavanaugh case, PHH Corp. v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau.273 There
he wrote the majority opinion for a D.C. Circuit panel decision (later re-
versed when reheard en banc) which held that the Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau-an independent agency established under the Dodd-
Frank Act of 201 0-was unconstitutional because its director enjoyed "uni-
lateral authority" within the Executive Branch.
274
Judge Kavanaugh's opinions in both Free Enterprise Fund and PHH take
pains to detail how the regulatory bodies at issue in those cases were struc-
tured in an unusual way, even relative to other independent agencies.
2 75
But the Free Enterprise Fund dissent also entertains the argument that inde-
pendent agencies can never be constitutional, since no intrusion on Presi-
dential control of administrative bodies is permissible, even at the mar-
gin.2 76 Interestingly, there is no point in the dissent where that argument
270. See Lisa Schultz Bressman & Robert B. Thompson, The Future ofAgenty Independence,
63 VAND. L. REV. 599, 600, 610 (2010).
271. 537 F.3d 667 (2008).
272. See id at 685, 715 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting). Judge Kavanaugh has labeled this
his most significant case, and his dissent was adopted by the Supreme Court when it granted
cert and reversed the D.C. Circuit. See Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight
Bd., 561 U.S. 477 (2010).
273. 839 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2016).
274. See id at 7; see also PHH Corp. v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 881 F.3d 75, 165
(D.C. Cir. 2018) (en banc) (Kavanaugh,J. dissenting).
275. See Free Enter. Fund, 537 F.3d at 685-715 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting); PHH Corp.,
839 F.3d at 5-55.
276. See Free Enter. Fund, 537 F.3d at 697 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting); cf. Elena Kagan,
Presidential Administration, 114 HARv. L. REv. 2245 (2001); Geoffrey P. Miller, Independent Agen-
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gets rebutted. Judge Kavanaugh only drops the idea after stating that it is
not "[flor this Court" to say whether the Supreme Court's approval of in-
dependent agencies in its landmark 1935 case-Humphrey's Executor--was
rightly decided.2 77 Because there are over a hundred such agencies, this
casts doubt on a substantial swath of the administrative state.
2. The Critique ofAgency Adjudication
Separation of powers concerns also underlie Judge Kavanaugh's skepti-
cism toward agency adjudication. The Lorenzo dissent provocatively sug-
gests that the SEC's internal adjudication of securities law claims is "in
some tension" with several constitutional provisions-Article III, Fifth
Amendment due process, and the Seventh Amendment right to a civil tri-
al-without expanding on what that might mean.2 78 Upon a closer look, all
three of those alleged constitutional defects can be traced back to Judge
Kavanaugh's separation of powers perspective.
The Lorenzo dissent's allusion to Article III is most straightforward.
Those provisions vest the federal courts with jurisdiction over all justiciable
cases-or-controversies that arise under federal law.2 79 This makes agency
adjudication problematic, as it represents an encroachment by the Execu-
tive on the judiciary's constitutionally-assigned role.
Administrative courts also raise a Fifth Amendment problem for related
reasons. The independence of federal judges is secured by the fact that
their exclusive responsibility is to exercise the judicial power, along with a
potential lifetime tenure and other protections provided under Article 111.280
By contrast, the SEC Commissioners who decided Lorenzo's case are, in
Judge Kavanaugh's words, "political appointees" beholden to the President
and Congress, and are responsible for implementing their policy goals.
28'
Because an essential element of due process is a neutral decisionmaker, the
political loyalties of agency adjudicators run afoul of the Fifth Amendment's
des, 1986 SUP. CT. REv. 41, 73 (1986).
277. See Free Enter. Fund, 537 F.3d at 697; see also Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654
(1988); Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935).
278. Lorenzo v. SEC, 872 F.3d. 578, 602 (D.C. Cir. 2017).
279. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 ("The judicial Power of the United States, shall be
vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to
time ordain and establish."); id § 2 ("The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law
and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties
made, or which shall be made, under their Authority ... ").
280. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (providing that 'Judges, both of the supreme and inferior
Courts, shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour, and shall, at stated Times, receive
for their Services, a Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their Continuance
in Office")
281. Lorenzo, 872 F.3d at 602; cf. Andrew N. Vollmer, Accusers as Adjudicators in Agency
Enforcement Proceedings, 52 U. MIcH.J.L. REFORM (forthcoming 2018) (analyzing the potential
conflicts of interest that arise from Executive Branch adjudication).
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guarantees.282
The Seventh Amendment right to a civil trial carries implications for
agency adjudication in a few ways. Most directly it appears to allocate the
judicial fact-finding function to juries rather than bureaucratic tribunals.2
83
This too rolls up into a separation of powers theory at a deeper level.
When taken together with Article III, the Seventh Amendment's guarantee
is that findings of fact in federal cases or controversies will be the product of
a jury's deliberation as they are made in conjunction with the procedural
protections and judicial supervision of the federal courts.2 84 As such, the
potential Seventh Amendment problem for administrative adjudication is
an Article III problem as well.
There is at least one good explanation for why the Lorenzo dissent does
not delve into the constitutional tensions it identifies. As Judge Kavanaugh
is aware, well-established Supreme Court precedent explicitly rejects all of
the arguments outlined above.28 5 Those constitutional arguments still hold
sway in the dissent's reasoning indirectly, however, by negating the stand-
ard justifications for providing deference to agency decisions.
Under Judge Kavanaugh's separation of powers critique, federal courts
are not aggrandizing the Judicial Branch with respect to Congress or the
President when they decline to give deference to administrative courts. In-
stead, they are upholding the proper balance established under Article III,
because neither of those branches have constitutional authorization to ex-
ercise the judicial power. It also follows that federal courts do not owe ad-
ministrative adjudicators deference on account of their comparative institu-
tional competence. Without the neutrality and procedural safeguards
secured under Article III, the standard narrative of technocratic expertise
no longer applies. If anything, the separation of powers critique suggests
that decisions by administrative courts will be relatively biased and error-
prone compared to those of federal courts. Although this line of theorizing
is highly generalized and abstract, it then feeds directly into Judge Ka-
vanaugh's review of the SEC decision in Lorenzo.
From the dissent's perspective, Judge Srinivasan is right that substantial
282. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 271 (1970) ("Of course, an impartial decision
maker is essential" to the requirements of due process).
283. U.S. CONST. amend. VII. See generally Gibbons, supra note 164 (arguing that the
practice of judicial fact-finding is unconstitutional under the Seventh Amendment's histori-
cal test and legislative history approach).
284. See Gibbons, supra note 164 (detailing the interaction between jury deliberation
and procedural supervision); see also Walker, supra note 164 (discussing related issues).
285. See, e.g., Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 271 (holding that agency adjudicators can be consid-
ered impartial for due process purposes); CFTC v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 858 (1986) (holding
that agency adjudication does not conflict with the scope ofjudicial power vested in Article
llI); Atlas Roofing, Inc. v. Occupational Safety Comm'n, 430 U.S. 442, 461 (1977) (holding
that agency adjudication may be consistent with the Seventh Amendment right to a jury tri-
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evidence review of agency fact-finding is a "very deferential" standard on
paper, but wrong that it must also be deferential in practice. The SEC's
"so much for a fair trial" performance in Lorenzo exemplifies how an agen-
cy's fact-finding process can be so deficient that even the low bar of sub-
stantial evidence may not be cleared in many cases. The same is true for
judicial review of other aspects of administrative proceedings to the extent
they are scrutinized under an arbitrary and capricious standard.2 86 The ar-
bitrary and capricious standard is equally deferential on its face. But that
does not necessarily tie the federal court's hands so long as it is also the case
that administrative adjudications are in fact conducted in a manner that is
arbitrary and capricious a good deal of the time. Judge Kavanaugh adopts
this exact view when he writes that the SEC's treatment of Lorenzo contra-
dicts the "premise" that administrative courts can be expected to "operate
with efficiency and with fairness.' 287 Thus, in Lorenzo, Judge Kavanaugh
lays out a roadmap for his broader commitment to the judicial philosophy
that courts may forego deference to agency adjudications in favor of a
much more searching "hard look" review.
3. The Critique ofAgency Rulemaking
Judge Kavanaugh's skepticism toward the regulatory state does not stop
with administrative courts and is no less pronounced in the rulemaking con-
text, where agencies serve a quasi-legislative function. Since an agency's
authority to promulgate regulatory rules ultimately stems from the fact that
it is implementing or "filling in the gaps" of a particular Congressional stat-
ute, the rulemaking process implicitly requires an agency to interpret what
those background statutory provisions mean. Here again, judicial defer-
ence to agency decisionmaking is a cornerstone principle of administrative
law. Most importantly, with the Chevron doctrine. 
288
The precise meaning of Chevron is probably the most over-debated topic
in all of law; but usually the doctrine is broken down into two steps.2 89 In
286. ALJ conclusions of law are technically subject to de novo review under the APA.
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012). But many other aspects of the adjudi-
cative process are reviewed for arbitrary and capriciousness. See WERHAN, supra note 155, at
357-61 (explaining the relationship between substantial evidence review and arbitrary-and-
capricious review).
287. Lorenzo v. SEC, 872 F.3d 578, 602 (D.C. Cir. 2017).
288. Technically, agencies can also perform an equivalent form ofrulemaking within its
adjudicative decisions as well. See SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 209 (1947) (holding
that agencies have discretion to choose the procedural forum they use to announce rules).
289. See, e.g., Matthew Stephenson & Adrian Vermeule, Chevron Has Only One Step, 95
VA. L. REv. 597 (2009) (reducing the traditional two-step framework to a single criterion);
Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REv. 187 (2006) (analyzing the threshold ques-
tion of how to decide whether Chevron should apply at all); Thomas W. Merrill & Kristen E.
Hickman, Chevron's Domain, 89 GEO. LJ. 833 (2001) (questioning the scope of Chevron's do-
main in connection with the Sunstein "Step Zero" analysis).
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step one, the court asks whether the meaning of the statutory provision at
issue is ambiguous and susceptible to multiple interpretations.
2 90 If so, it
moves on to step two. In step two, the court asks whether the agency's
proposed interpretation is "reasonable."291 A court must defer to the agen-
cy's statutory interpretation whenever it makes it to the end of step two and
the answer is yes.292 Chevron is just one variation on the theme of deference
to agency's legal interpretations. When an agency interprets its own regula-
tion, as opposed to a statute, essentially the same analytical framework ap-
plies but is called Auer deference.2 93 When an agency's statutory interpreta-
tion arises in connection with one of its guidance documents or other
informal policy statements-rather than more formal rules which carry the
"force of law"-those interpretations receive slightly less weight, under a
standard of review known as Skidmore deference.
2 94
Judge Kavanaugh has criticized the Chevron doctrine in a number of
speeches and non-judicial writings. In a 2016 article published in the Har-
vard Law Review, Fixing Statutory Interpretation, he wrote that "judges should
strive to find the best reading of the statute... [and] should not be diverted
by an arbitrary initial inquiry into whether the statute can be characterized
as clear or ambiguous."29 5 The same sentiment was echoed in Judge Ka-
vanaugh's Stoy Lecture, when he stated that, "courts should determine
whether the agency's interpretation is the best reading of the statutory
text." 296 As should be clear, these propositions are antithetical to Chevron:
the entire premise of that doctrine is that statutory ambiguity matters, and
makes the court's "best reading" irrelevant so long as the agency has pro-
posed a different reading that is reasonable.
297
At times, Judge Kavanaugh's writings on Chevron are more equivocal. A
passage in his Harvard Law Review article concedes that "Chevron makes a lot
290. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842
(1984).
291. Id at 844.
292. Id
293. Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997); see Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass'n, 135
U.S. 1199, 1208 n.4 (2015) (listing qualifications for Auer deference); Bowles v. Seminole
Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945); see alsoJohn F. Manning, Constitutional Structure
and Judicial Deference to Agency Interpretations of Ageny Rules, 96 COLUM. L. REv. 612 (1996);
Cass R. Sunstein & Adrien Vermeule, The Unbearable Rightness ofAuer, 84 U. Cm. L. REv.
297 (2017).
294. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944); see also United States v. Mead
Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 237 (2001) (laying out the test for when Chevron versus Skidmore defer-
ence applies); cf. David Zaring, Reasonable Agencies, 96 VA. L. REv. 135 (2010) (analyzing how
much the different standards vary as applied in practice).
295. Kavanaugh, Fixing Statutoy Interpretation, supra note 7, at 2144.
296. Kavanaugh, Story Lecture, supra note 7, at 9.
297. See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond Marbury: The Executive's Power to Say What the
Law Is, 115 YALE LJ. 2580 (2006).
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of sense in certain circumstances.' 298 But as that article goes on to explain,
those circumstances are limited to two scenarios: (a) where the statutory text
explicitly directs an agency to implement its provisions in any "reasonable"
or "feasible" manner; or (b) when the procedural posture of an agency's de-
cision implies that, as applied, Chevron deference is the functional equivalent
of arbitrary and capricious review and therefore redundant with the stand-
ard articulated under Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Ass'n v. State Farm Auto Insur-
ance Co.299 In effect, the Chevron doctrine makes a lot of sense whenever it
resembles something else. As Judge Kavanaugh himself admits, the excep-
tions he identifies do not salvage anything from the doctrine.30 0
Underlying Judge Kavanaugh's critique of Chevron is a familiar separa-
tion of powers logic. Deferential review of agency legal interpretations is
inconsistent with Article III, which vests interpretative authority over the
meaning of Congressional statutes exclusively with the federal judiciary. It
is a "constitutional mandate," he states, for the federal courts to prevent
their monopoly over that interpretative authority from being diffused
among the other branches.30' And again, once the case for judicial defer-
ence fails as a legal matter of constitutional structure, the pragmatic justifi-
cation collapses as well. Agencies have no institutional advantage when it
comes to statutory interpretation because "that [is] what judges are trained
to do."302
The Chevron doctrine upsets the Constitution's finely-tuned separation of
powers structure on multiple fronts, in fact, not just Article III. According
to Judge Kavanaugh, it also encroaches on the legislative power which Ar-
ticle I vests first and foremost with Congress. In the same Harvard Law Re-
view article, he declares that, "[i]n many ways, Chevron is nothing more than
a judicially orchestrated shift of power from Congress to the Executive
Branch."303 He continues, "I can confidently say that Chevron encourages
the Executive Branch (whichever party controls it) to be extremely aggres-
sive in seeking to squeeze its policy goals into ill-fitting statuary authoriza-
tions and restraints. " 304 Executive Branch aggression aside, Judge Ka-
vanaugh places ultimate blame with the federal courts. The doctrine has
always been a legally flawed judicial fiction and the Court's decision in
298. Kavanaugh, Fixing Statutory Interpretation, supra note 7, at 2152.
299. 463 U.S. 29 (1983); Kavanaugh, Fixing Statutoy Interpretation, supra note 7, at 2153-
54.
300. Kavanaugh, Maintaining the Separation of Powers, supra note 7, at 9 ("But that is not
really the Chevron doctrine.").
301. Id. at 4.
302. Id at 9.
303. Kavanaugh, Fixing Statutoy Interpretation, supra note 7, at 2150.
304. Id; see also Kavanaugh, Kenote Address, supra note'7, at 1911 ("Chevron doctrine en-
courages agency aggressiveness on a large scale. Under the guise of ambiguity, agencies can




Chevron was an affront to Congressional authority in the first place: "it has
no basis in the Administrative Procedure Act.... [I]f anything, Chevron
seems to flout the language of the Act. °3 0 5 Particularly in light of Judge
Kavanaugh's endorsement of textualist theories of statutory interpretation,
this represents an independent ground for the Court to announce that Chev-
ron is no longer good law.
30 6
While there is no mention of Chevron (or Auer) in Lorenzo, the doctrine still
hovers over the D.C. Circuit's decision. When the SEC originally formu-
lated its theory of scheme liability from Lorenzo in an early agency decision,
the SEC Commission claimed its interpretation of Section 10(b) and Rule
lOb-5 was entitled to Chevron deference.30 7 The D.C. Circuit's decision in
Lorenzo reads as if it more or less agrees. Nowhere in Judge Srinivasan's
majority opinion does the court articulate its own "best reading" of the rel-
evant anti-fraud provision and ask how the SEC's version measures up. In-
stead, the majority opinion proceeds with the agency's proposed interpreta-
tion as its starting point and then searches through the relevant case law
and statutory materials until it feels assured that the SEC's position is at
least plausible.
308
By contrast in the dissent, Judge Kavanaugh's analysis does not seem to
countenance the possibility that the SEC has any privileged insight into the
meaning of the federal securities laws. After all, that is the court's area of
expertise. The dissent's assertion that the SEC's fact-finding "deserves ju-
dicial repudiation, not deference" effectively applies to its statutory inter-
pretation as well. 309 And in calling for judicial pushback against the SEC's
revanchist interpretations of the securities laws in general, Judge Ka-
vanaugh's separation of powers critique can be seen at work. Chevron not-
withstanding, the federal courts have a constitutional responsibility to ac-
tively police the SEC's legal interpretations because they attempt an "end
run" around the judiciary's authoritative readings of the statutory com-
mands issued by Congress.3
10
Judge Kavanaugh's belief in the preeminent role of federal courts for
questions of statutory interpretation has often translated into opinions that
avoid Chevron deference in creative ways.3 1' A noteworthy example is his
305. Kavanaugh, Fixing Statuto Interpretation, supra note 7, at 2150, 2150 n.161.
306. See id at 2135 ("[C]lear statutes are to be followed. Statutory texts are not just
common law principles or aspirations to be shaped and applied as judges think reasona-
ble.").
307. John P. Flannery, Exchange Act Release No. 3981, 2014 WL 7145625, at *12
(Dec. 15, 2014).
308. See Lorenzo v. SEC, 872 F.3d 578, 588-92 (D.C. Cir. 2017).
309. Id. at 600 (Kavanaugh,J., dissenting).
310. Id at 601.
311. For example, in In re Aiken County, Judge Kavanaugh's majority opinion stated that
the "policy is for Congress and the President to establish as they see fit in enacting statutes,"
while the judiciary's "more modest task" is to ensure that "agencies comply with the law as it
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dissenting opinion in United States Telecom Ass'n v. FCC,312 which urged the
court to reverse its prior decision upholding a Federal Communications
Commission (FCC) net neutrality regulation by deferring to the agency's
interpretation of the 1934 Federal Communications Act.313 The dissent ar-
gued that Chevron was inapplicable because "Congress ha[d] not clearly au-
thorized the FCC to issue [such a] major rule." 314 By treating statutory
ambiguity as a basis to forbid rather than accommodate agency discretion,
the dissent's formulation is unusual and arguably flips Chevron on its head.
The most frequent way thatJudge Kavanaugh shuts the door on judicial
deference is by cutting the Chevron analysis short at "step one" with a finding
that the statutory language in question is unambiguous.3 15 One impressive
application of that approach is his majority opinion for the D.C. Circuit in
Loving v. Internal Revenue Service.316 There, the court had to interpret a provi-
sion from an 1884 tax law, in particular its language granting the IRS au-
thority to "regulate the practice of representatives of persons before the
Department of Treasury."317 After analyzing the "text, history, structure,
and context of the statute," Judge Kavanaugh's majority opinion for the
court explained why the meaning of that (seemingly opaque) language was
unambiguous, and concluded that the IRS was not entitled to Chevron def-
erence.3
18
The overall vision here is bold, especially ifJudge Kavanaugh's stronger
statements are taken at face value. The thrust of those statements can be
summed up as follows. All independent agencies are probably unconstitu-
tional per se. The constitutional legitimacy of administrative adjudication
is also suspect, at best. Even if lawful, agency adjudication is a poor substi-
tute for the resolution of federal cases by judges in Article III courts because
it generates decisions that are prone to bias or legal error. A partial solu-
tion is for federal courts to give those decisions a hard look upon review ra-
ther than deference. For administrative rulemakings, the reasonableness of
an agency's substantive statutory interpretations has no independent legal
significance and must be rejected to the extent it does not coincide with the
best reading of the court. If the Chevron doctrine suggests otherwise, it is in-
compatible with the Constitution's separation of powers structure as well as
the Administrative Procedure Act. All told, Judge Kavanaugh's theory of
the modern regulatory state leaves very little of its legal foundations safe
from a potentially fundamental reappraisal.
has been set by Congress." 725 F.3d 255, 257 (D.C. Cir. 2013).
312. 855 F.3d 381 (2017).
313. See id. at 417-18 (Kavanaugh,J., dissenting).
314. Id
315. See Kavanaugh, Fixing Statutogy Interpretation, supra note 8, at 2137, 2144.
316. 742 F.3d 1013 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
317. Id. at 1014 (citing 31 U.S.C. § 330(a)(1)).
318. Id. at 1015.
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B. Farewell, Chevron?
The biggest doctrinal question mark that Judge Kavanaugh's nomina-
tion raises in administrative law is the fate of Chevron. With the 2010 re-
tirement of Chevron's author, Justice Stevens,319 and the passing in 2016 of
its other intellectual architect, Justice Scalia,320 the consensus that had coa-
lesced around that case since it was announced in 1980s has weakened con-
siderably.321 Indeed, many have observed that the doctrine is affirmatively
on the retreat.3 22 As Professor Michael Kagan has put it, that retreat has
taken place through a steady trickle of "anti-Chevron" opinions which vary in
intensity from "soft" to "loud."
323
The two loudest members of the Court in this respect have been Justice
Thomas and Justice Gorsuch, both of whom have authored opinions that
advocate for Chevron to be overruled in full. An important statement byJus-
tice Thomas came in his concurrence to a 2015 decision, Michigan v. EPA,32
4
where he wrote: "'[T] he judicial power, as originally understood, requires a
court to exercise its independent judgment in interpreting and expounding
upon the laws.' . . . Chevron deference precludes judges from exercising that
judgment.... It thus wrests from Courts the ultimate interpretative au-
thority to 'say what the law is."' 32 5 Even before joining the Court, Justice
Gorsuch had also endorsed a similar view as an appellate judge for the
Tenth Circuit. In an influential concurrence to a 2016 case, Gutierrez-
Brizuela v. Lynch,326 Judge Gorsuch stated that Chevron is "difficult to square
with the Constitution" and directly questioned its continuing viability as
good law, declaring that "[m]aybe the time has come to face the behe-
moth. "327
319. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. 467 US. 837 (1984);
320. Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 DUKE
LJ. 511 (1989).
321. See Michael Kagan, Loud and Soft Anti-Chevron Decision, 53 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
37, 39 (2018) (arguing that "the Chevron doctrine will continue but that the consensus period
of its history is finished"); see also Scalia, supra note 320.
322. See, e.g.,Jonathan Adler, Restoring Chevron's Domain, 81 Mo. L. REV. 983 (2016);
Catherine M. Sharkey, In the Wake of Chevron's Retreat I (conference paper) (June 2, 2016)
(on file with George Mason University) ("It is time to take stock of Chevron's retreat."); Carlos
A. Hernandez, From Arlington to Tennessee: The Beginnings of a Chevron Deference Farewell
Tour?, 47 Sw. L. REV. 179 (2017).
323. Kagan, supra note 321, at 40.
324. 135 S. Ct. 2699 (2015).
325. Id. at 2712 (internal citations omitted); see also Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass'n, 135
S. Ct. 1199, 1213-25 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring); Tex. Dep't of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs
v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507, 2529 (2015) (Thomas, J., dissenting); Wy-
eth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 586, 582-604 (2009) (Thomas,J., concurring).
326. 834 F.3d 1142 (10th. Cir. 2016).
327. Idt at 1149 (Gorsuch,J., concurring); see also Wis. Cent. Ltd. v. United States, 138
S. Ct. 2067 (2018) (Gorsuch,J., concurring). See generally Trevor W. Ezell & Lloyd Marshall,
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Several other Justices have issued softer anti-Chevron opinions, which do
not call for the doctrine to be eliminated entirely but nonetheless seek to
limit its reach in various ways.328 One leading voice for this approach is
Justice Breyer. In a number of opinions, Justice Breyer has asserted that
the applicability of Chevron is a context-sensitive determination, which can-
not be settled by the question of textual ambiguity alone and instead de-
pends on a laundry list of other factors.329
Another active member of the soft anti-Chevron camp is Chief Justice
Roberts, particularly in his opinions which develop the so-called "major
questions" doctrine. That doctrine carves out an exception to Chevron,
holding that federal courts do not owe deference to agency interpretations
of ambiguous statutory language in cases that raise legal questions of great
national importance.330 The most notable recent use of the major questions
doctrine came in the ChiefJustice's majority opinion for the Court in King
v. Burwell,331 a case which turned on the availability of tax credits for users
of federal health insurance exchanges established under the Obama Ad-
ministration's Affordable Care Act.332 After conceding that the relevant Af-
fordable Care Act provisions were ambiguous, the majority opinion went
on to state the IRS was not entitled to Chevron deference because King was
an "extraordinary case" that raised a question of "deep economic and polit-
ical significance."
333
Justice Kennedy has contributed to the canon of "soft" anti-Chevron opin-
ions as well, most recently with a concurrence in one of his very final cases,
Pereira v. Sessions.334 There, Justice Kennedy wrote that "it seems necessary
and appropriate to reconsider, in an appropriate case, the premises that
underlie Chevron and how courts have implemented that decision."335 Jus-
tice Kennedy's concurrence also specifically took issue with the tendency of
If Goliath Falls: Judge Gorsuch and the Administrative State, 69 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 171 (2017).
328. Cf Kent Barnett, Why Bias Challenges to Administrative Adjudication Should Succeed, 81
Mo. L. REV. 1023, 1036 (2016) (noting the increasing tendency of courts to skip over Chevron
in cases where it would otherwise seem to apply).
329. See, e.g., City of Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290, 308-09 (2013) (Breyer, J., con-
curring); see also Christensen v. Harris Cty., 529 U.S. 576, 596-97 (2005) (Breyer,J., dissent-
ing). The number of factors thatJustice Breyer cites as weighing against Chevron deference is
often sufficiently large that at least one of them could conceivably apply in any given case.
See, e.g., City ofArlington, 569 U.S. at 308-09.
330. FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 159-61 (2000)
(providing one of the earliest articulations of the major questions exception); see Sunstein,
supra note 289, at 193 (discussing the Court's reliance on the major questions doctrine).
331. 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015).
332. Seeid. at 2488.
333. Id at 2488-89 ("In extraordinary cases, however, there may be reason to hesitate
before concluding that [Chevron applies because] Congress has intended such an implicit del-
egation. This is one of those cases.") (internal citations and quotations omitted).
334. 138 S. Ct. 2105 (2018).
335. Id. at 2121 (Kennedy,J., concurring).
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appellate courts to adopt a second-order form of "reflexive deference"-for
example, by deferring to an agency's position on whether Chevron is appli-
cable to its interpretation in the first instance.
336
Justice Alito also wrote separately in Pereira, with a dissent that described
Chevron as a "once celebrated, and now increasingly maligned prece-
dent."337 WhileJustice Alito declined to say if he thought Chevron was right-
ly maligned or not, his dissent emphasized its status as binding precedent by
observing that unless there has been "a secret decision that has somehow
escaped my attention, [Chevron] remains good law."
338 Justice Alito can
nonetheless be tentatively counted among the Court's soft anti-Chevron coa-
lition. The main data point on that count is his decision to join the dissent
of ChiefJustice Roberts in Ciy ofArlington v. FCC,
339 an important statement
on the limits of judicial deference, which the Court's majority accused of
having "Chevron itself as the ultimate target.
' '340
Justice Kavanaugh no doubt favors overturning Chevron in full or other-
wise redefining its holding out of existence. By replacing Justice Kennedy,
that reshuffles the balance of "loud" versus "soft" critics at the Court and
brings it to a three-three tie. However, the significance of Judge Ka-
vanaugh's nomination for the future of judicial deference to the administra-
tive state is much greater than a shift in that tally of votes.
A bigger issue is howJustice Kavanaugh's membership on the Court will
affect the votes of other Justices.341 The relevant model here isJustice Pow-
ell. By leveraging his corporate law background, he was able to single-
handedly elevate the place of securities law issues on the Court's docket and
build a consensus around his own personal theory of how those issues
should be decided.342 Like Justice Powell, Justice Kavanaugh will bring a
trademark philosophy to the Court that is backed by his particular area of
expertise. This means that his positions on the administrative state will not
only gain one more vote, but also a voice on the Court that may carry other
votes along in its path. When the Justices meet in conference, the kinds of
forceful arguments that Judge Kavanaugh presents in the Lorenzo dissent
will be heard from his seat at the table. And he will stand ready to put
those arguments in writing for his colleagues, with proposed opinions that
draw upon the theoretical framework which Judge Kavanaugh has com-
336. Id. at 2120.
337. Id at 2121 (Alito,J., dissenting).
338. Id. at 2129.
339. 569 U.S. 290 (2013).
340. Id. at 312, 327 (Roberts, CJ., dissenting) ("An agency cannot exercise interpretive
authority until it has it; ... whether an agency enjoys that authority must be decided by a
court, without deference to the agency.").
341. See supra note 16 (referencing the empirical literature on "panel effects" at appel-
late courts).
342. Sullivan & Thompson, supra note 226, at 1592-94.
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prehensively developed in his speeches, writings, and opinions on the D.C.
Circuit.
343
This is why the Court's eventual decision in Lorenzo is even more intri-
guing with Justice Kavanaugh recused. It is already clear what opinions he
holds on those issues. But it will be much clearer what the other members
of the Court think of his views once they reach a decision on Lorenzo in
2019 and issue opinions that must unavoidably grapple with the arguments
laid out in the dissent. The Court's reception of those arguments therefore
promises some early suggestive evidence on the question of whetherJustice
Kavanaugh will be a successful judicial entrepreneur for his views on ad-
ministrative law, in the way that Justice Powell was in securities regulation.
This Article's reading of Lorenzo as the bellwether for the fate of Chevron and
related administrative law doctrines of judicial deference stems from that
dynamic. If Justice Kavanaugh can gain traction with other members of
the Court, particularly Chief Justice Roberts or Justice Alito, he may be
able to amplify his third vote in favor of a "loud" all-out repudiation of
Chevron into a full majority.
VI. CONCLUSION
This Article has provided an analysis of the Supreme Court's pending
resolution to Lorenzo v. SEC which examines that case in light ofJustice Ka-
vanaugh's addition to the Court in the wake of Justice Kennedy's retire-
ment. As has been shown, Lorenzo raises a number of weighty issues at the
core of federal securities law doctrine. It also features a dissent by Judge
Kavanaugh from the D.C. Circuit majority's decision which, upon a close
reading, affords a uniquely in-depth perspective on his overall judicial phi-
losophy. Lorenzo also represents a treasure trove of insights from a number
of other angles. By anchoring Justice Kavanaugh's critique of the adminis-
trative state within the pragmatic realities of actual judicial decisionmaking,
this Article avoids the empty abstractions which can sometimes accompany
theoretical discussions of lofty concepts such as the constitutional separation
of powers and demonstrates how the intellectual framework that underpins
Justice Kavanaugh's dissent also informs his answers to specific questions of
law.
343. Besides deliberative or rhetorical persuasion, there are many other ways that indi-
vidual judges may affect the behavior of their colleagues on multi-member courts. See
Fischman, supra note 16 (surveying the various theories); see, e.g., RICHARD POSNER, How
JUDGES THINK 32-34 (2008) (arguing for a "dissent aversion" theory ofjudicial interaction);
Frank B. Cross & Emerson H. Tiller, Judicial Partisanship and Obedience to Legal Doctrine.- Whis-
tleblowing on the Federal Courts of Appeals, 107 YALE LJ. 2155-76 (1998) (arguing that panel ef-
fects may be the result of judge's strategic "whistleblowing" tactics); CASS R SUNSTEIN, ET
AL., AREJUDGES POLITICAL?: AN EMPIRIcAL ANALYSIS OF THE FEDERALJUDICIARY 71-78
(2006) (providing a "group polarization" model, in which like-minded judges push each oth-
er to extremes).
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Lastly, the most significant contribution of this article is to interpret Jus-
tice Kavanaugh's dissent in Lorenzo through a framework that focuses on
what that opinion will say about other Supreme Court Justices. The conclu-
sions that a future Justice Kavanaugh will reach in cases that implicate his
core concerns about the intersection of constitutional and administrative
law are easy enough to discern from a survey of his overall judicial output
at the D.C. Circuit. But what will ultimately determine Justice Ka-
vanaugh's legacy on the Supreme Court, and what remains to be seen, is
the extent to which other members of the Court will gravitate toward his
views on those issues as well. Therein lies the broadest potential signifi-
cance of Lorenzo, as bellwether of Justice Kavanaugh's success as a judicial
entrepreneur for his distinct brand of counter-revolutionary jurisprudence
on administrative law.
